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(377) 
ARTICLE 
OUR REGIONALISM 
JESSICA BULMAN-POZEN† 
This Article provides an account of Our Regionalism to supplement the many 
accounts of Our Federalism. After describing the legal forms regions assume in the 
United States—through interstate cooperation, organization of federal administrative 
agencies, and hybrid state–federal efforts—it explores how regions have shaped 
American governance across the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. 
In the years leading up to the New Deal, commentators invoked regions to resist 
centralization, arguing that state coordination could forestall expansion of the federal 
government. But regions were soon deployed to a different end, as the federal 
government relied on regional administration to develop its bureaucracy. Incorporating 
regional accommodations and regional organization into new programs allowed the 
federal government to expand its role in domestic policymaking. As interstate 
regionalism yielded to federal regionalism, the administrative state was propelled 
forward by a strategy that had arisen to resist it. Even as regions facilitated the 
expansion of the New Deal administrative state, however, the regional organization 
and argument that underpinned this development left room for state influence within 
federal programs and for new projects of multistate and joint state–federal governance. 
The century’s next regional moment brought this potential to the fore, with regions 
brokering the resurgence of the states in Great Society programs. 
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staff for thoughtful editing, and the William S. Friedman Faculty Research Fund for support. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2927714 
378 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 166: 377 
In the early twenty-first century, new regional undertakings have been celebrated 
as fluid, nonhierarchical networks. Although the network metaphor has been 
exhausted, this characterization anticipates the emergence of “regionalism without 
regions”: collaborations among multiple state and federal actors that need not involve 
contiguous areas. Just as regional improvisation has responded to governance 
challenges of past decades, this nascent development responds to today’s polarized 
partisanship. It betokens both the revival and the transformation of the political 
sectionalism that has always informed American regionalism, even as it slipped 
behind an administrative veneer for much of the twentieth century. 
 
INTRODUCTION .............................................................................. 378 
I. A TAXONOMY ........................................................................... 383 
A. Interstate Collaboration ............................................................... 384 
B. Federal Administrative Divisions .................................................. 388 
C. Joint Federal–State Organization .................................................. 392 
II. FROM STATE TO NATION: PLANNING THE NEW DEAL .............. 394 
A. Regions Against the Federal Government ....................................... 395 
B. Regions Within the Federal Government ......................................... 401 
1. Accommodation ................................................................. 402 
2. Administration .................................................................. 404 
C. Sectionalism Versus Regionalism ................................................... 409 
III. FROM NATION TO STATE: MANAGING THE GREAT SOCIETY ..... 415 
A. Hybrid Administration .................................................................416 
B. In Search of Intergovernmental and Interagency Coordination .......... 422 
IV. TOWARD A NEW POLITICS OF AREA .......................................... 427 
A. A Space for the Network .............................................................. 427 
B. Regionalism without Regions ........................................................ 432 
1. Contemporary Partnerships ............................................... 433 
2. From Sectionalism to Partisanship...................................... 436 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................. 440 
 
INTRODUCTION 
One Sunday in the spring of 2016, newspaper readers awoke to a new map 
of the United States. A country of seven brightly colored regions spread 
across two pages of the New York Times.1 Although “American policy making 
remains wedded to an antiquated political structure of 50 distinct states,” 
 
1 Parag Khanna, A New Map for America, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/
2016/04/17/opinion/sunday/a-new-map-for-america.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2017). 
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Parag Khanna wrote, the “reality” of the United States is regional.2 Instead 
of focusing on Massachusetts, Kansas, and California, we should attend to the 
“natural” geographical and economic divisions of the country, including the 
Great Northeast, the Great Plains, and the Pacific Coast.3 
One Sunday in the winter of 1930, newspaper readers likewise awoke to a 
new map of the United States. Announcing the winners of a contest to redraw 
the country’s internal boundaries to be more “logical and scientific,” the 
Chicago Daily Tribune published four regional renderings of the country.4 Like 
Khanna nearly ninety years later, the prize winners argued that regions, not 
the extant forty-eight states, were the “natural” areas of geographical, 
economic, and civic unity around which to orient American governance. 
The potential, and peril, of regionalism is periodically rediscovered in the 
United States.5 Long after Founding-era proposals to have a tripartite 
sectional executive6 and some sixty years after the Civil War, interest in the 
regional composition of the United States revived in the 1920s and 1930s. 
Policymakers, scholars, and artists lavished attention on regions—areas of the 
country encompassing all or part of multiple states that were understood to 
possess geographical, cultural, or political identity. Following a few decades 
of waning enthusiasm, regionalism reemerged in the 1960s and 1970s. 
In the early twenty-first century, commentators and public officials are 
once more turning to regions. From environmental regionalism to 
immigration regionalism, education regionalism to economic regionalism, a 
range of proposals advocate new institutions or collaborations that would 
occupy the space “between state and nation.”7 Still others call to rehabilitate 
 
2 Id. 
3 Ana Swanson, Six Maps that Will Make You Rethink the World, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (Apr. 
29, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/04/29/six-maps-that-will-make-
you-rethink-the-world/ [https://perma.cc/9RBF-9Q2X] (quoting Khanna describing the seven 
regions as “the natural topography and economic geography of the United States”). See generally 
PARAG KHANNA, CONNECTOGRAPHY (2016). 
4 William Shinnick, Select Grand Prize Winners in Map Contest, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Jan. 5, 1930, at A5. 
5 See, e.g., EDWARD L. AYERS ET AL., ALL OVER THE MAP 2 (1996) (discussing “a cyclical 
process of forgetfulness and rediscovery of the idea of region” in the United States); MARTHA A. 
DERTHICK, BETWEEN STATE AND NATION: REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS OF THE UNITED 
STATES 3 (1974) (describing regionalism as being “subject to intellectual fad and fashion”). 
6 James Madison, Proceedings of Committee of the Whole House, May 30–June 19, in 1 THE RECORDS OF 
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 88 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) (reporting that Edmund Randolph 
advocated “three members of the Executive to be drawn from different portions of the Country”). 
7 E.g., Keith Aoki & John Shuford, Welcome to Amerizona—Immigrants Out!: Assessing “Dystopian 
Dreams” and “Usable Futures” of Immigration Reform, and Considering Whether “Immigration Regionalism” 
Is an Idea Whose Time Has Come, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1 (2010) (advocating immigration 
regionalism); Kirsten H. Engel, Mitigating Global Climate Change in the United States: A Regional 
Approach, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 54 (2005) (environmental regionalism); Douglas R. Williams, 
Toward Regional Governance in Environmental Law, 46 AKRON L. REV. 1047 (2013) (environmental 
regionalism); Hannah Wiseman, Expanding Regional Renewable Governance, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 
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existing regional arrangements.8 In regions, some find the possibility of 
solutions more comprehensive than those generally offered by states, while 
others find the possibility of solutions more diverse than those generally 
offered by the federal government. 
Coexisting with these regional proposals are concerns about regionalism’s 
“bad twin,” sectionalism, and rancorous divisions within the country.9 In the 
age of Brexit and serious (if still implausible) secessionist talk in the United 
States,10 renewed anxiety about the divisive power of sectionalism haunts 
renewed excitement about the governance possibilities of regionalism.11 
Such renewed interest makes this a fitting time to consider regionalism 
and the law. In many academic disciplines, regions have pride of place. They, 
more than the states, underlie American elegy, nostalgia, and expectation, as 
well as critical responses to these impulses.12 In the law, we tend instead to 
 
477 (2011) (environmental regionalism); Gary Beach, Is it Time To Restructure the Education 
Department?, EDUC. WEEK (Nov. 15, 2016), http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2016/11/16/is-it-
time-to-restructure-the-education.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2017) (education regionalism); Stephen 
C. Fehr, The United Regions of America, PEW CHARITABLE TR. (Apr. 22, 2010), http://
www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2010/04/22/the-united-regions-of-
america [https://perma.cc/9HP8-RSFT] (economic regionalism); David Robinson, Multi-State 
Regionalism: The Future of Economic Development, PA TIMES (May 22, 2015), http://patimes.org/multistate-
regionalism-future-economic-development/ [https://perma.cc/Y7JS-4LBA] (economic regionalism). 
“Between state and nation” is Martha Derthick’s phrase. DERTHICK, supra note 5. 
8 See, e.g., Dave Owen, Regional Federal Administration, 63 UCLA L. REV. 58, 115 (2016); Yishai 
Blank & Issachar Rosen-Zvi, Reviving Federal Regions, 70 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018). 
9 Patricia Nelson Limerick, Region and Reason, in AYERS ET AL., supra note 5, at 83. Limerick pithily 
captures the distinct connotations of the two terms: “Regions . . . unite, while sections divide. Regions 
can both complement and compliment one another; sections can only compete. Regions have their roots 
in a warm and hearty connection between distinctive people and distinctive places; sections have their 
roots in political and economic struggles for dominance . . . . Regions coexist; sections cause civil wars.” 
Id.; see infra Section II.C (discussing New Deal era distinctions between “sectionalism” and 
“regionalism”); infra Section IV.B (discussing contemporary political sectionalism). 
10 E.g., Doug Bandow, With Britain Voting on Brexit, Is It Time for an American Exit, or Amexit, from 
the Union?, FORBES (June 6, 2016, 6:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/dougbandow/
2016/06/06/with-britain-voting-on-brexit-is-it-time-for-an-american-exit-or-amexit-from-the-union/
#5ad765a66280 [https://perma.cc/LJW6-TE65]; Dennis Romero, California’s Attempt to Exit Trump’s 
America Is Officially Here, LA WEEKLY (Jan. 30, 2017, 7:46 AM), http://www.laweekly.com/news/
californias-attempt-to-exit-trumps-america-is-officially-here-7870678 (last visited Oct. 13, 2017). 
11 This, too, is old. See, e.g., JAMES W. FESLER, AREA AND ADMINISTRATION 123 (1949) (“The 
coin bearing ‘regionalism’ on its face carries ‘sectionalism’ on its reverse side.”). 
12 Compare, e.g., WALLACE STEGNER, WHERE THE BLUEBIRD SINGS TO THE LEMONADE 
SPRINGS, at xv (1992) (“[T]he West at large is hope’s native home, the youngest and freshest of 
America’s regions, magnificently endowed and with the chance to become something unprecedented 
and unmatched in the world.”), with id. at 98 (“[N]either nostalgia nor boosterism can any longer 
make a case for [the West] as the geography of hope.”). For a sampling of recent inquiries into 
regional culture, identity, and psychology, see AYERS ET AL., supra note 5; JAMES C. COBB, AWAY 
DOWN SOUTH (2005); JOSEPH A. CONFORTI, IMAGINING NEW ENGLAND (2001); PATRICIA 
NELSON LIMERICK, SOMETHING IN THE SOIL: LEGACIES AND RECKONINGS IN THE NEW 
WEST (2001); NICOLE MELLOW, THE STATE OF DISUNION: REGIONAL SOURCES OF MODERN 
AMERICAN PARTISANSHIP (2008); COLIN WOODARD, AMERICAN NATIONS: A HISTORY OF THE 
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focus on “Our Federalism,” with its polarity of “State and National 
Government.”13 There is good reason for this. Regions captivate other 
disciplines in part because they lack precise institutional form. Without fixed 
boundaries, regions may seem more “real” than the artificial states, and the 
common tally of between three and twelve regions offers a more manageable 
way to parse the country than a fifty-state division. But without fixed 
boundaries, regions are hard places for law.14 
And yet, regionalism has critically informed legal developments. Lacking set 
institutional form, but possessing cultural resonance as well as administrative 
utility, regions have been a resource for projects of state-building and for 
resistance to such projects. They have influenced how power flows to and 
within the federal government. In the words of Justice Felix Frankfurter, 
regionalism has perpetually posed—and variously answered—the question of 
“how a country that is a continent can be governed by organs that fairly 
represent its disciplined will and at the same time adequately evoke the 
diverse civilized potentialities of its people.”15 
This Article provides an account of “Our Regionalism,” describing the 
legal forms regions assume in the United States and exploring how these 
forms have shaped American government over the past century. Regionalism 
has long been associated with state resistance to the federal government, but 
it has also been a potent tool of federal bureaucracy. If regional coordination 
has sometimes enabled states to compete with, or to repel the expansion of, 
federal administration, the federal government’s own reliance on regional 
accommodation and organization has facilitated its entry into new 
 
ELEVEN RIVAL REGIONAL CULTURES OF NORTH AMERICA (2011); Peter J. Rentfrow et al., 
Divided We Stand: Three Psychological Regions of the United States and Their Political, Economic, Social, 
and Health Correlates, 105 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 996 (2013). 
13 See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) (stating that “Our Federalism” represents “a system 
in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and National Governments”). 
14 See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, The Volk of New Jersey? State Identity, Distinctiveness, and Political 
Culture in the American Federal System 7 (Feb. 24, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://
scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=6121&context=faculty_scholarship (“[S]tates 
provide an institutional reference point that neither regions nor localities can match.”). There is a 
rich literature on regionalism at the local government level. See, e.g., GERALD E. FRUG, CITY 
MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT BUILDING WALLS (2d ed. 2001); HENRY R. 
RICHMOND ET AL., REFLECTIONS ON REGIONALISM (Bruce Katz ed., 2000); Richard Briffault, 
Localism and Regionalism, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (2000); Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of 
Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1841 (1994); Laurie Reynolds, Local 
Governments and Regional Governance, 39 URB. LAW. 483 (2007). Although my focus in this Article 
is on multistate regionalism, there is a significant relationship between multistate and local 
regionalism. Metropolitan regionalism often encompasses multiple states given the locations of large 
cities like New York and Chicago, and the foundations of multistate regionalism may lie in local 
projects. See, e.g., Howard W. Odum, The Promise of Regionalism, in REGIONALISM IN AMERICA 395, 
395 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1951) (“Both planning and regionalism had their beginning in localism.”). 
15 Felix Frankfurter, Foreword to REGIONALISM IN AMERICA, supra note 14, at xv. 
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policymaking spaces. Moreover, the relationship between states and the 
federal government within regions is dynamic: multistate collaborations 
frequently invite federal intervention, while regional federal administration 
gives states leverage in federal programs. When considering the critical 
influence of regionalism on Our Federalism, then, regions cannot be placed 
on either the state or the federal side of the balance. 
The Article begins with an overview of contemporary regional 
governance. The perpetual rediscovery of regionalism might suggest that the 
regional form is scarce in the United States, but regions are already prominent 
in state, federal, and joint state–federal undertakings. To substantiate this 
claim, Part I provides examples as well as a simple taxonomy of interstate, 
federal, and hybrid regional governance. 
Before returning to the present day, Parts II and III explore the twentieth 
century’s two leading regional moments to show how the region was a critical 
resource for negotiating American federalism in times of administrative 
change. Part II describes regionalism’s contribution to the New Deal 
administrative state. In the 1920s and early 1930s, regions were invoked to 
resist centralization. Commentators insisted that regions were authentic, 
organic divisions of the country as well as governance units that might repel 
expansion of the federal bureaucracy: if regional solutions could address 
problems that exceeded individual states’ capacity, Washington would not 
need to intervene. But regions were soon deployed to a different end, as the 
federal government relied on regional administration to develop its 
bureaucracy. Incorporating both regional substantive accommodations and 
regional management structures into new programs allowed the federal 
government to expand its role in domestic policymaking. 
The story was not a simple one of cooptation, however. Even as regions 
facilitated the expansion of the New Deal administrative state, the regional 
organization and argument that underpinned this development left room for 
state influence within federal programs as well as for new projects of 
multistate and joint state–federal governance. As Part III explains, the 
century’s next regional moment brought this potential to the fore, with 
regions brokering the resurgence of the states in Great Society programs. 
Part IV considers contemporary regionalism. In keeping with the reigning 
metaphor at the turn of the twenty-first century, recent regional projects have 
been celebrated as networks—flexible, nonhierarchical partnerships crossing 
jurisdictional lines. Although the metaphor has been overused, this 
characterization of regionalism anticipates a development we might term 
“regionalism without regions”: collaborations among state and federal actors 
that need not involve contiguous areas. Just as regional improvisation has 
responded to governance challenges of past decades, “regionalism without 
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regions” suggests that a new politics of space is developing in response to 
today’s main governance challenge, our polarized partisanship. We are 
witnessing both the revival and the transformation of the political 
sectionalism that has long lurked behind administrative regionalism. 
I. A TAXONOMY 
For purposes of this project, I define the region as a subnational area 
encompassing all or part of multiple states. Many accounts of regionalism 
would require more—ecological, cultural, or economic homogeneity that would 
differentiate a particular area.16 The discernment, and occasional projection, of 
a distinct identity frequently lends force to regional argument, even when the 
impetus for regional organization is more administrative in nature. But an 
appreciation of the role regionalism has played in shaping American 
government requires a stripped-down understanding. The distinguishing 
feature of the region, on this view, is that it departs from established state and 
federal jurisdictional lines to form a suprastate yet subnational area.17 
This Part offers an overview of existing regional governance in the United 
States. Some regional forms emerge from interstate collaborations, while 
others are purely federal in character, and still others involve both state and 
federal actors. To be sure, there are ways to approach this taxonomic project 
without focusing on the actors involved. For example, one might consider 
whether a regional scheme involves a single area or instead partitions the 
entire country. Is the region oriented around some particular areal concern, 
 
16 See, e.g., U.S. NAT. RES. COMM., REGIONAL FACTORS IN NATIONAL PLANNING 138 (1935) 
[hereinafter NRC REPORT] (“‘[R]egionalism’ is a clustering of environmental, economic, social, and 
governmental factors to such an extent that a distinct consciousness of separate identity within the 
whole, a need for autonomous planning, a manifestation of cultural peculiarities, and a desire for 
administrative freedom are theoretically recognized and actually put into effect.”); Matthew 
McKinney et al., Regionalism in the West: An Inventory and Assessment, 23 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES 
L. REV. 101, 101 (2002) (“‘Region’ is defined as ‘a broad geographic area containing a population 
whose members possess sufficient historical, cultural, economic, or social homogeneity to distinguish 
them from others” (quoting WEBSTER’S UNABRIDGED THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL 
DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1993))); William B. Munro, Regional Governments for Regional Problems, 185 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 123, 130 (1936) (“A region . . . is any area within which the 
geographic conditions, the economic ambitions, the social texture, and the political traditions have 
established a consciousness of a common interest different from that of other areas in the Nation.”). 
17 This definition tracks those of some classic studies. See, e.g., DERTHICK, supra note 5, at 2 
(“The organizations described are ‘regional’ in the sense that their jurisdictions cover all or parts of 
several states.”); HOWARD W. ODUM & HARRY E. MOORE, AMERICAN REGIONALISM: A 
CULTURAL-HISTORICAL APPROACH TO NATIONAL INTEGRATION 29 (1938) (studying “natural 
regions” and sections alongside “the region for convenience” and “the group-of-states region”); see 
also id. at 23 (“Whether regionalism results from the growth of a sense of community, in turn 
dependent upon common traditions, interests and aspirations, or whether it results from man’s 
rational analysis of economic and governmental problems needing solution, it is none the less 
regionalism.” (quoting Marshall E. Dimock, unpublished manuscript)). 
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or is it a managerial approach to governing a “country the size of a continent”? 
Although different in the questions it foregrounds, this categorization would 
overlap substantially with the one I offer here: interstate regionalism tends to 
be partial, while federal regionalism tends to parse the entire nation. There 
are, however, some notable exceptions to this pattern that I will flag. 
Another approach might focus on whether regions follow or depart from 
state boundaries. If regions are ecological or cultural areas, they need not 
conform to the arbitrary rectangles that often define our states,18 and regions 
that transect state lines might be particularly attractive to federal actors 
seeking to supplant state authority. Notwithstanding salient examples, 
including the Federal Reserve Districts and the Tennessee Valley Authority, 
however, federal regions rarely depart from state lines. Moreover, while a 
variety of interstate agreements focus on particular portions of the states 
involved—for instance, a river basin or a metropolitan area—they largely rely 
on established state political and administrative structures. In brief, whether 
created by state actors, federal actors, or both, most regional schemes do not 
redraw boundaries to circumvent states. 
In outlining existing regional forms, this Part seeks to demonstrate that 
regional organization pervades state and federal administration. It also begins 
to lay the foundation for an overarching claim of this project, namely that 
state and federal regionalism must be examined together. Although state and 
federal regional forms can be distinguished both practically and 
conceptually—as they are in what follows—their histories and current 
workings are deeply intertwined. 
A. Interstate Collaboration 
The oldest device for regional governance—and the only one expressly 
provided for by the Constitution—is the interstate compact. Article I, Section 
10 provides, “No State shall, without the Consent of Congress . . . enter into 
any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power.”19 
Since the late nineteenth century, however, the Supreme Court has held that 
congressional consent is not required for all interstate agreements, but only 
 
18 See Samuel H. Beer, Federalism, Nationalism, and Democracy in America, 72 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 9, 16 (1978) (“None of these rationales, administrative, economic or cultural, makes sense of 
the American states, except occasionally and accidentally. Look at the map. It must make you wonder 
whether there could have been a United States, if the rectangle had not been invented.”); see also 
FESLER, supra note 11, at 2 (“When we speak of the administrative problem of area, therefore, we 
must not visualize the country as a flat, monotonous plane to be neatly cut into rectangles by a 
governmental Paul Bunyan armed with a giant cookie cutter.”). 
19 U.S. CONST. art I, § 10. 
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for those “tending to the increase of political power in the States, which may 
encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the United States.”20 
Between the nation’s founding and the early twentieth century, states 
entered into thirty-six compacts, all of which addressed state boundaries in 
some respect (including providing for the separation of West Virginia from 
Virginia).21 In the 1920s, new interest arose in the compact as a regional form 
that might address ongoing problems through institutions such as commissions 
or agencies.22 The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey was established 
in 1921 to administer transportation and port activities and was the first 
compact to establish a permanent administrative body. Other important 
regional compacts of the era addressed energy and the environment.23 
Today, more than 150 interstate compacts are in effect,24 and the regional form 
remains dominant.25 Regional compacts address a range of issues, including the 
 
20 Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 519 (1893). The Court has also recognized that 
congressional consent may be implied rather than express. See id. at 521. In light of the Court’s 
interpretation of the Compact Clause, many interstate agreements do not involve the federal 
government at all. See, e.g., U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n 434 U.S. 452, 468-69 (1978); 
Star Scientific v. Beales 278 F.3d 339, 359-60 (4th Cir. 2002); McComb v. Wambaugh, 934 F.2d 474, 
479 (3d Cir. 1991); Tichenor v. Missouri State Lottery Comm’n, 742 S.W.2d 170, 177 (Mo. 1988). 
21 JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, HORIZONTAL FEDERALISM: INTERSTATE RELATIONS 45 (2011) 
[hereinafter ZIMMERMAN, HORIZONTAL FEDERALISM]. 
22 As I will elaborate in Section II.A, in the early twentieth century, compacts were particularly 
attractive to state officials and commentators who wanted to hold off federal regulation and preserve 
a greater scope of action for states. To this day, commentators continue to celebrate the ability of 
compacts to enhance states’ capacity to respond to pressing problems without the federal 
government’s intervention. See, e.g., Matthew S. Tripolitsiotis, Bridge Over Troubled Waters: The 
Application of State Law to Compact Clause Entities, 23 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 163, 211 (2005) 
(“Compact entities are clearly a vital tool to deal with problems that are too big for any single state 
but do not rise to a national concern.”); see also ZIMMERMAN, HORIZONTAL FEDERALISM supra 
note 21, at 231. 
23 See, e.g., JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, INTERSTATE COOPERATION: COMPACTS & 
ADMINISTRATIVE AGREEMENTS 44 (2d ed. 2012) [hereinafter ZIMMERMAN, INTERSTATE 
COOPERATION]; Tripolitsiotis, supra note 22, at 171. 
24 Although some estimates indicate more than 200 compacts, many are not in effect. One 
hundred fifty is a relatively conservative estimate. See CAROLINE N. BROUN ET AL., AM. BAR ASS’N, 
THE EVOLVING USE AND THE CHANGING ROLE OF INTERSTATE COMPACTS: A PRACTITIONER’S 
GUIDE 178 (2006); ZIMMERMAN, HORIZONTAL FEDERALISM, supra note 21, at 45-46; ZIMMERMAN, 
INTERSTATE COOPERATION, supra note 23, at 237-58 app.A; Ann O’M. Bowman, Horizontal Federalism: 
Exploring Interstate Interactions, 14 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 535, 539 (2004). 
25 Many compacts are not regional, however. Some of those that involve all fifty states include the 
Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision, the Interstate Compact on the Placement of 
Children, and the Emergency Management Assistance Compact. See About the Commission, INTERSTATE 
COMM’N FOR ADULT OFFENDER SUPERVISION, http://www.interstatecompact.org/About 
[https://perma.cc/D36C-6AY5]; About: Who We Are, INTERSTATE COMPACT ON THE PLACEMENT OF 
CHILDREN, http://www.aphsa.org/content/AAICPC/en/about.html [https://perma.cc/E4ZD-YDTB]; 
What is EMAC?, EMERGENCY MGMT. ASSISTANCE COMPACT, https://www.emacweb.org/
index.php/learn-about-emac/what-is-emac [https://perma.cc/S9G7-TKCB]. Other compacts fall short of 
fifty-state membership but include states from across the country. See, e.g., Compact on Mental Health, 
NAT’L CTR. FOR INTERSTATE COMPACTS (2011), http://apps.csg.org/ncic/Compact.aspx?id=42 [https://
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management of environmental resources such as river basins, lakes, and 
fisheries;26 geographically tailored approaches to pollution27 and waste disposal;28 
as well as education,29 criminal justice,30 and energy,31 among other topics.32 
States have also entered into less formal regional agreements. In contrast 
to compacts, which involve a cession of state sovereignty and bind each state 
party, interstate agreements are more flexible alignments that allow for 
 
perma.cc/3S7G-3HBZ]; Driver License Compact, NAT’L CTR. FOR INTERSTATE COMPACTS (2011), 
http://apps.csg.org/ncic/Compact.aspx?id=56 [https://perma.cc/KC2J-KMX9]; OFFICES OF THE U.S. 
ATTORNEYS, Interstate Agreement on Detainers, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/
usam/criminal-resource-manual-534-interstate-agreement-detainers [https://perma.cc/ZS4P-HHR2]; 
Interstate Wildlife Violator Compact, NAT’L ASS’N OF CONSERVATION LAW ENF’T CHIEFS (2014), 
https://www.naclec.org/landing/ [https://perma.cc/JFZ9-2SRD]. See generally Ann O’M. Bowman 
& Neal D. Woods, Expanding the Scope of Conflict: Interest Groups and Interstate Compacts, 91 SOC. SCI. 
Q. 669, 671 (2010) (“In their fullest flowering, interstate compacts possess the potential for 
nationwide policy making without the active involvement of national institutions.”). 
26 E.g., Colorado River Compact, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-1311 (2017); Arkansas River 
Basin Compact of 1970, Pub. L. No. 93-152, 87 Stat. 569 (1973); Bear River Compact, Pub. L. No. 
96-189, 94 Stat. 4 (1980); Connecticut River Flood Control Compact, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 25-99 
(1953); Great Lakes Basin Compact Act, 45 ILL. COMPILED STAT. 145/1 (2016); Potomac River 
Compact of 1958, MD. CODE ANN., NATURAL RESOURCES § 4-306 (2016); Atlantic States Marine 
Fisheries Compact, MD. CODE ANN., NATURAL RESOURCES § 4-305 (2016); Yellowstone River 
Compact, MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-20-101 (1950); California-Nevada Interstate Compact, NEV. 
REV. STAT. § 538.600 (2016); Red River Compact, OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 1431 (2016); Columbia 
River Gorge Compact, OR. REV. STAT. § 196.150 (2016); Rio Grande Compact, TEX. WATER 
CODE ANN. § 41.009 (1971). 
27 E.g., Ohio River Valley Water Sanitation Compact, 45 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/1 (2016); New 
England Interstate Water Pollution Control Compact, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 21, § 1-1 (2016); 
Interstate Environmental Compact, MISS. CODE ANN. § 49-21-1 (2017). 
28 E.g., Atlantic Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Mgmt. Compact (2017), 
http://www.atlanticcompact.org/ [https://perma.cc/K4B5-AEVD]; Central Interstate Low-Level 
Radioactive Waste Compact, NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-1599 (2016); Northwest Compact on Low-Level 
Radioactive Waste Management, OR. REV. STAT. § 469.930 (2016); Southeast Interstate Low-Level 
Radioactive Waste Compact, TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-202-701 (2016); Southwestern Low-Level 
Radioactive Waste Disposal Compact, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30-722 (2016). 
29 New England Higher Education Compact, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 2691 (2016); New 
Hampshire-Maine Interstate School District Compact, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200-F:1 (2016); 
New Hampshire-Vermont Interstate School District Compact, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200-B:1 
(2016); Western Regional Education Compact, CAL. EDUC. CODE § 99001 (West 2016); Southern 
Regional Education Compact, MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 25-202 (West 2016). 
30 New England Interstate Corrections Compact, ME. STAT. tit. 34, § 9201 (2016); Western 
Interstate Corrections Compact, UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-28-1 (West 2016). 
31 Compact to Conserve Oil and Gas, S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-41-10 (2017); Southern States 
Energy Compact, LA. STAT. ANN. § 51:1001 (2016); Midwest Energy Compact, IOWA CODE 
§ 473A.1 (2016); Western Interstate Nuclear Compact, CAL. GOV’T CODE § 67401 (West 2016). 
32 See generally BROUN ET AL., supra note 24, at 197-492 (providing a survey of contemporary 
compacts); ZIMMERMAN, INTERSTATE COOPERATION, supra note 23, at 237-48 app.A. States have also 
entered into international compacts with Canadian provinces on a regional basis. See, e.g., Northeastern 
Forest Fire Protection Compact, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 2511 (2016); International Emergency 
Management Assistance Compact, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 201 (2016); About the GLFCC, GREAT LAKES 
FOREST FIRE COMPACT, http://www.glffc.com/information/about-the-glffc/ (last visited Sept. 3, 2017). 
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unilateral withdrawal. Like compacts, agreements may be national in scope, 
but most are regional,33 and they too span a range of subjects, including 
agriculture, law enforcement, education, emergency assistance, transportation, 
and the environment.34 For instance, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
was created by a memorandum of understanding among the governors of 
Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, New Hampshire, New York, and Vermont (and 
previously New Jersey, which will likely rejoin soon); each participating state 
has adopted legislation or regulations consistent with a model rule to establish 
a mandatory cap and trade system, and a regional organization offers support.35 
On the opposite coast, the governors of California, Nevada, Utah, and 
Wyoming adopted a memorandum of understanding seeking to facilitate 
electric transmission in the region.36 Other administrative agreements are more 
informal, even ad hoc.37 
A final, less common form of state-based regional coordination—and one 
that falls at the periphery of the category—involves the synchronized 
adoption of substantially similar laws. Despite the ubiquity of uniform state 
laws, frequently drafted by the national-yet-not-federal38 Uniform Law 
Commission, these laws are rarely adopted on a regional basis.39 Yet states 
sometimes seek to prod other states to adopt similar legislation. In particular, 
smaller states recognizing that they lack power to shape national markets 
 
33 ZIMMERMAN, INTERSTATE COOPERATION, supra note 23, at 174. 
34 See id. at 171-215 (describing the nature and scope of administrative agreements). 
35 See REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, https://www.rggi.org [https://perma.cc/2X28-
ZD7Z]. New Jersey withdrew in 2011. See Letter from Bob Martin, Comm’r., N.J. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., to 
the governors of RGGI signatory states (Nov. 29, 2011) (providing “Notice of Withdrawal of Agreement 
to the RGGI Memorandum of Understanding from State of New Jersey to Signatory States”). 
36 Memorandum of Understanding Among the Governors of California, Nevada, Utah and 
Wyoming Concerning Electric Transmission Development (Apr. 4, 2005). 
37 See ZIMMERMAN, INTERSTATE COOPERATION, supra note 23, at 230 (describing informal 
administrative agreements). 
38 Cf. Judith Resnik et al., Ratifying Kyoto at the Local Level: Sovereigntism, Federalism, and 
Translocal Organizations of Government Actors (TOGAs), 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 709, 784 (2008) 
(“Translocal organizations like the National League of Cities, the U.S. Conference of Mayors, and 
the collectives of state attorneys general, governors, and state legislators are all exemplary of the 
multiplication of ‘national’ players, rooted in states and localities yet reaching across them.”); see also 
Cristina M. Rodríguez, Negotiating Conflict Through Federalism: Institutional and Popular Perspectives, 
123 YALE L.J. 2094, 2100 (2014) (arguing that “‘national’ issues—those whose salience cuts across 
state lines and constituencies—are not always or necessarily best served by a federal monopoly”). 
39 Some are adopted nationwide—for instance, the Uniform Commercial Code, the Uniform 
Trade Secrets Act, and the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act. Acts, UNIF. L. 
COMM’N, http://www.uniformlaws.org/Acts.aspx [https://perma.cc/XUT8-YPA4]. Even though many 
proposed uniform laws are taken up selectively, they are rarely adopted in a regional fashion. At the 
same time, there is some evidence of regional diffusion of state law more generally. See, e.g., Christopher 
Z. Mooney, Modeling Regional Effects on State Policy Diffusion, 54 POL’Y RES. Q. 103 (2001). 
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through regulatory standards40 have sometimes conditioned the force of a 
new state law on consistent action in neighboring jurisdictions.41 Most 
recently, several northeastern states have sought to impose a regional 
requirement to label genetically modified foods, with Connecticut 
conditioning its labeling law on the passage of substantially similar legislation 
by its neighbors.42 
B. Federal Administrative Divisions 
If compacts, agreements, and synchronized laws are common state-based 
forms of regional governance, another prevalent form is something of the 
inverse: the division of purely federal administrative agencies into regional 
offices.43 In contrast to bottom-up, interstate collaborations, federal regional 
administration is top-down in its approach, and it almost always parses the 
entire nation into regions. This bottom-up/top-down framing is an 
oversimplification—for instance, many regional compacts have been not only 
approved but affirmatively instigated by the federal government, while regional 
divisions of federal agencies respond to and foster state interests—but it is 
useful in beginning to distinguish among regional forms. 
Looking for regions within federal agencies yields two inescapable 
conclusions. First, regional organization pervades federal administration. 
Although this point has been largely overlooked in the recent slew of 
 
40 In contrast, large states like California may unilaterally alter the conduct of national market 
participants. See generally DAVID VOGEL, TRADING UP: CONSUMER AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
REGULATION IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY (1995). 
41 See, e.g., Samuel McCune Lindsay, Reciprocal Legislation, 25 POL. SCI. Q. 435, 454 (1910) 
(describing a New Jersey act for the protection of sturgeon on the Delaware River that provided it 
“shall take effect when similar acts shall have been passed by the legislatures of Delaware and 
Pennsylvania” and ensuing similar acts by Pennsylvania and Delaware); see also Patrick Cronin, The 
Historical Origins of the Conflict Between Copyright and the First Amendment, 35 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 
221, 234 (2012) (noting that some “States tried to solve the obvious problem of piracy of their works 
in neighboring States by passing copyright laws which would only take effect when every other State 
passed similar laws,” but that because “Delaware failed to pass a copyright statute, the statutes with 
this provision never went into effect”). 
42 An Act Concerning Genetically-Engineered Food § 3(a), 2013 CONN. ACTS 775 (Reg. Sess.) 
(conditioning the Act’s effectiveness on the adoption of similar labeling laws for genetically-
engineered foods by states in the northeast—defined as Maine, Vermont, New Hampshire, 
Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania—at least one of which 
borders Connecticut and the aggregate population of which is 20 million); see also An Act to Protect 
Maine Food Consumers’ Right to Know About Genetically Engineered Food § 2(1), 2014 ME. LAWS 
1 (making the effective date contingent upon the adoption of mandatory labeling laws by at least five 
other states). These state efforts seem likely to be preempted by recent amendments to the 
Agricultural Marketing Act. See Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946, ch. 7, § 1621, 1639(i), 130 Stat. 
834, 834-39 (2016) (“[N]o State . . . may . . . establish . . . any requirement relating to the labeling 
of whether a food . . . or seed is genetically engineered . . . .”). 
43 See Owen, supra note 8. 
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proposals to move federal agencies outside of the Washington metropolis,44 
eighty-five percent of federal employees work in offices outside the D.C. 
area.45 Second, there is substantial divergence in federal agencies’ regional 
organization. The closest thing to a standard regional approach is a ten-region 
scheme introduced by President Richard Nixon in 1969.46 Today, this scheme 
is used by the Department of Housing and Urban Development,47 the 
Department of Health and Human Services,48 the Environmental Protection 
Agency,49 and the Small Business Administration,50 as well as by particular 
 
44 See H.R. 2112, 115th Cong. § 2 (2017) (proposing a commission to study relocating executive 
agencies outside of D.C.); H.R. 826, 115th Cong. § 3 (2017) (proposing to move executive agencies 
outside of the D.C. area); H.R. Res. 38, 115th Cong. (1st Sess. 2017) (expressing the sense of the House 
that federal agencies should relocate outside of D.C.). The stated rationales for these proposals sound 
in both redistribution and local knowledge. See H.R. 2112, § 6 (suggesting agency “relocation to a low-
income community” or “to areas with expertise”); H.R. Res. 38 (noting that “Federal agencies employ 
thousands of individuals and provide jobs and economic benefits to the areas in which the agencies 
are located” and that “the impact of regulations can be perceived more easily by those who are 
proximate to the affected industries”). 
45 About Us, FED. EXEC. BDS., https://feb.gov [https://perma.cc/QV52-BMT4]. 
46 Richard M. Nixon, Statement on Establishing Common Regional Boundaries for Agencies 
Providing Social and Economic Services, PUB. PAPERS 255, 256 (Mar. 27, 1969) (issuing “a directive which 
streamlines the field operations of five agencies by establishing, for the first time, common regional 
boundaries and regional office locations”) [hereinafter Nixon, Common Regional Boundaries]; see OFFICE 
OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CIRCULAR NO. A-105, STANDARD 
FEDERAL REGIONS (1974) [hereinafter OMB, CIRCULAR NO. A-105] (“This Circular formally 
establishes ten standard Federal regions, uniform regulation boundaries, and common regional office 
headquarters locations . . . .”); infra Section III.B (considering Nixon’s creation of standard regions). 
The standard regions are as follows, with the headquarter city noted in parentheses: 
1. Conn., Me., Mass., N.H., R.I., Vt. (Boston) 
2. N.J., N.Y. (New York City) 
3. Del., Md., Pa., Va., D.C., W.V. (Philadelphia) 
4. Ala., Fla., Ga., Ky., Miss., N.C., S.C., Tenn. (Atlanta) 
5. Ill., Ind., Mich., Minn., Ohio, Wis. (Chicago) 
6. Ark., La., N.M., Okla., Tex. (Dallas-Fort Worth) 
7. Iowa, Kan., Mo., Neb. (Kansas City) 
8. Colo., Mont., N.D., S.D., Utah, Wyo. (Denver) 
9. Ariz., Cal., Haw., Nev. (San Francisco) 
10. Alaska, Idaho, Or., Wash. (Seattle) 
OMB, CIRCULAR NO. A-105. Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands are sometimes placed in 
Region Two and sometimes in Region Four. Compare About EPA, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION 
AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/aboutepa [https://perma.cc/PCR7-2FRV] (including Puerto Rico 
and the Virgin Islands in Region Two), with HUD’s Regions, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING & URB. DEV., 
https://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/localoffices/regions [https://perma.cc/ALW2-5448] 
(including Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands in Region Four). 
47 U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING & URB. DEV., supra note 46. 
48 Regional Offices, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERV., https://www.hhs.gov/about/agencies/
regional-offices/index.html [https://perma.cc/HG2N-D9H2]. 
49 U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 46. 
50 Regional Offices, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., https://www.sba.gov/tools/local-assistance/
regionaloffices [https://perma.cc/F8MT-EXHP]. 
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agencies within the Department of Homeland Security,51 the Department of 
Labor,52 and the Department of Transportation,53 and by public-facing offices 
within the Department of Education54 and the Department of Justice.55 
While this ten-region scheme was a deliberate attempt to standardize 
federal regions, thereby facilitating interagency coordination and presidential 
supervision, it remains a minority approach, and the “chaos” of various regional 
configurations that past Presidents have sought to quell remains.56 Even within 
single cabinet departments, various agencies employ different regional forms. 
For instance, within the Department of Transportation, the Federal Transit 
Administration uses the common ten-region scheme, but the Maritime 
Administration uses ten different regions,57 the Federal Railroad 
Administration relies on eight regions,58 the Federal Aviation Administration 
divides its property operations into nine regional offices,59 and the Federal 
Highway Administration uses four regions for its field services and three for 
its federal lands highway divisions.60 So too, within the Department of 
Agriculture, the Forest Service uses nine regions, while the Food and Nutrition 
Service uses seven, neither of which align with the standard ten-region plan.61 
Other executive agencies use still other regional configurations.62 
 
51 See, e.g., FEMA Regional Offices, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, https://emilms.fema.gov/
IS101c/DEP0101150text.htm [https://perma.cc/YU6Z-JH4W]. 
52 See, e.g., OSHA Offices by State, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., https://www.osha.
gov/html/RAmap.html [https://perma.cc/EW8P-YPPU]. 
53 See, e.g., Regional Offices, FED. TRANSIT ADMIN., https://www.transit.dot.gov/about/regional-
offices/regional-offices [https://perma.cc/RPT4-8R48]. 
54 See, e.g., U.S. Department of Education Regional Office Contact Information, U.S. DEP’T EDUC., 
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/elsec/guid/secletter/020207enc.html [https://perma.cc/CFH9-CRVU]. 
55 Regional and Field Offices, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/crs/about-crs/
regional-and-field-offices [https://perma.cc/U94M-WCMQ]. 
56 NRC REPORT, supra note 16, at 81; see infra Section III.B (discussing past attempts to standardize 
federal regions). 
57 Gateway Offices, MAR. ADMIN., https://www.marad.dot.gov/about-us/gateway-offices/ [https://
perma.cc/BF67-GWS8]. 
58 Regional Offices, FED. R.R. ADMIN., http://www.fra.dot.gov/Page/P0244 [https://perma.cc/
A6G5-EUX9]. 
59 Regions and Property Operations, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/
headquarters_offices/arc/ [https://perma.cc/2UJE-K8XH]. 
60 Field Offices, FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/about/field.cfm [https://perma.cc/
3RX7-CQ75]. 
61 FNS Regional Offices, U.S. FOOD & NUTRITION SERV., https://www.fns.usda.gov/fns-
regional-offices [https://perma.cc/6ZGC-8JAM]; Forest Service Regions, U.S. FOREST SERV., 
https://www.fs.fed.us/wildflowers/regions/ [https://perma.cc/EEH5-BMDB]. 
62 E.g., Regional Offices, U.S. OFF. ENVTL. POL’Y & COMPLIANCE, https://www.doi.gov/
oepc/regional-offices [https://perma.cc/GG8W-8XS2] (showing eight regional offices). The 
Department of Interior generally uses eight regions. The Regions, U.S. DEP’T INTERIOR OFF. 
SOLIC., https://www.doi.gov/solicitor/regions [https://perma.cc/85CF-EMJT]. But see CSC Regions, 
U.S CLIMATE SCI. CTRS., https://www.doi.gov/csc/centers [https://perma.cc/9B2V-ZUHT]. The 
Solicitor in the Department of Labor uses seven regions. SOL Regional Offices, U.S. DEPT. LAB. OFF. 
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Many independent agencies also rely on regional organization, and also 
use a variety of regional forms. Perhaps most famously, the Federal Reserve 
System relies on twelve districts that were established in 1913; these districts 
surround the twelve Federal Reserve Bank cities and do not track state lines.63 
The Federal Trade Commission uses seven regional offices,64 the Federal 
Communications Commission relies on three enforcement regions,65 the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission has five regional offices focused 
principally on hydropower projects,66 the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau has four supervision regions,67 and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission has eleven regional offices.68 Unlike the Fed, most of these 
agencies’ regions follow state lines, although the SEC splits Northern and 
Southern California into two different regions.69 
A variety of federal corporations are also organized in a regional manner. 
Most distinctively, the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), which was created 
as a public–private hybrid in 1933, is a federal regional body that exists in only 
one area of the country.70 Drawn around the Tennessee River Valley, the TVA 
encompasses portions of seven states instead of tracking state lines. Other 
federal corporations, including the FDIC, the Postal Service, and the 
 
SOLIC., https://www.dol.gov/sol/regions/ [https://perma.cc/FX4F-FEWP]. The Department of State 
Office of Foreign Missions uses six regions. Regional Offices, U.S. DEP’T  ST. OFF. FOREIGN MISSIONS, 
https://www.state.gov/ofm/ro/ [https://perma.cc/QF9H-NQS4]. The Veterans Benefits Administration 
uses five regions. Locations, DEP’T OF VETERANS AFF., https://www.va.gov/directory/guide/division.
asp?dnum=3 [https://perma.cc/HU4F-7JAA]. 
Agencies’ regional organization continues to change. For example, the census recently closed half 
of its twelve regional offices and now uses six regions. Regional Offices, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://
www.census.gov/regions/ [https://perma.cc/Q3VP-Q9UB] (showing the six regions); see also Robert 
Groves, A Restructuring of Census Bureau Regional Offices, CENSUS DIRECTOR’S BLOG (Jun. 29, 2011), 
https://www.census.gov/newsroom/blogs/director/2011/06/a-restructuring-of-census-bureau-
regional-offices.html [https://perma.cc/THW8-72X6]. These regional offices differ from the four 
regions the Bureau uses to present census data. See Census Regions and Divisions of the United States, 
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www2.census.gov/geo/pdfs/maps-data/maps/reference/us_regdiv.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9KQV-68F2]. 
63 The Twelve Federal Reserve Districts, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/otherfrb.htm [https://perma.cc/CUP7-FDCT]. 
64 Regional Offices, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/bureaus-offices/regional-
offices [https://perma.cc/DP44-7DWG]. 
65 Regional & Field Offices, FCC, http://transition.fcc.gov/eb/rfo/ [https://perma.cc/GB9T-NLNP]. 
66 Regional Office Hydropower Contacts, FED. ENERGY REG. COMMISSION, https://www.ferc.gov/
contact-us/tel-num/regional.asp [https://perma.cc/U9NM-XFWW]. 
67 Paul Sanford, Meet Our Regional Directors, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU 
(Mar. 12, 2013), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/blog/meet-our-regional-directors/ [https://
perma.cc/779C-4UXX]. 
68 SEC REGIONAL OFFICES, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/page/sec-regional-offices [https://perma.cc/
2DJP-XKMW]. 
69 Id. 
70 See infra notes 156–162 and accompanying text (describing the creation and organization of the TVA). 
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Export–Import Bank divide their nationwide operations into regions in a way 
similar to executive and independent agencies.71 
Finally, Federal Executive Boards were created by President John F. Kennedy 
in 1961 to provide a “forum for communication and collaboration among Federal 
agencies outside of Washington, DC.”72 The ten original boards have become 
twenty-eight over time. Less ambitious than the Federal Regional Councils that 
President Nixon established (and President Ronald Reagan abolished),73 the 
Federal Executive Boards are overseen by the Office of Personnel Management, 
and though they focus on emergency preparedness, they  have addressed diverse 
subjects including access to food stamps and the use of wind power.74 
C. Joint Federal–State Organization 
If interstate agreements are principally bottom-up and federal administrative 
regions are principally top-down, perhaps the most distinctively regional form is 
the joint state–federal regional body.75 As Anne Joseph O’Connell has 
illuminated, there are a variety of organizations “at the boundary” of the federal 
government and other governments.76 At the state–federal boundary, these 
organizations are frequently regional. For instance, the first joint state–federal 
compact created the Delaware River Basin Commission (DRBC) in 1961.77 
Comprising the governors of Delaware, New Jersey, New York, and 
Pennsylvania and the commander of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers North 
Atlantic Division, the DRBC is charged with planning, conserving, and 
allocating water resources in the Delaware River Basin and has recently found 
 
71 E.g., Organization Directory and Office Contacts, FDIC, https://www.fdic.gov/about/contact/
directory/#Field_Offices [https://perma.cc/E2SM-WTKL] (listing the eight regional offices); Regional 
Export Finance Centers, EXPORT–IMPORT BANK U.S., http://www.exim.gov/contact/regional-export-
finance-centers [https://perma.cc/J7PQ-LK5H] (listing three regions). 
72 FED. EXEC. BDS., supra note 45. 
73 See infra Section III.B (describing the Federal Regional Councils). The Federal Executive 
Boards and Federal Regional Councils never developed a good working relationship. See, e.g., AM. 
SOC’Y FOR PUB. ADMIN., THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE NEW FEDERALISM 63 (Leigh E. 
Grosenick ed., 1973) [hereinafter ASPA, NEW FEDERALISM] (quoting William H. Kolberg, former 
Associate Director for Program Coordination for OMB, who described this relationship as 
“[u]ncomfortable”). 
74 See, e.g., William A. Galston & Geoffrey L. Tibbetts, Reinventing Federalism: The Clinton/Gore 
Program for a New Partnership Among State, Local, and Tribal Governments, 24 PUBLIUS 23, 32 (1994); Wallace 
O. Keene, New Directions for Federal Executive Boards and Associations, 30 PUB. MANAGER 23, 23 (2001). 
75 See generally DERTHICK, supra note 5 (exploring several state–federal regional 
organizations). 
76 Anne Joseph O’Connell, Bureaucracy at the Boundary, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 841, 861-63 (2014) 
(noting that the National Guard, Social Security Administration, Metropolitan Washington Airport 
Authority, Delaware River Basin Commission, Appalachian Regional Commission, and Financial 
Stability Oversight Council operate at the boundary between state and federal government). 
77 Delaware River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 87-328, § 2, 75 Stat. 688, 692 (1961); see infra 
Section III.A (describing the creation and structure of the DRBC). 
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itself at the center of contentious debates, including whether to allow fracking 
in the basin.78 In the decades since the DRBC was formed, federal–state 
compacts have been adopted for additional river basins, including the 
Susquehanna and the Alabama-Coosa-Tallapoosa.79 
Other joint state–federal bodies have been formed by interstate compact or 
by federal legislation. For example, the Metropolitan Washington Airports 
Authority created by interstate compact includes board members appointed by 
the Governor of Maryland, the Governor of Virginia, the Mayor of D.C., and 
the President.80 The Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC) created by 
federal law comprises the governors of the thirteen Appalachian states as well 
as a federal co-chair appointed by the President with the advice and consent of 
the Senate.81 
Recent regional projects have emphasized the role of interagency, as well 
as intergovernmental, coordination through joint state–federal efforts. 
Instead of selecting a single federal representative, these bodies tend to 
include a variety of federal agency officials. For instance, the Gulf Coast 
Ecosystem Restoration Council, which is responding to the Deepwater 
Horizon oil spill of April 2010, comprises the Secretaries of the Army, 
Interior, Commerce, Agriculture, and Homeland Security, and the 
Administrator of the EPA, as well as the governors of Alabama, Florida, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas.82 The Great Lakes Restoration Initiative 
Task Force, the Chesapeake Bay Federal Leadership Committee, and the 
Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Task Force similarly rely on the region for 
interagency and intergovernmental coordination.83 
Finally, federal agencies have turned to regional groups of state, local, and 
private actors to further their regulatory agendas. The EPA has relied on 
regional associations of states to advise it with respect to haze caused by ozone 
 
78 See Natural Gas Drilling Index Page, DEL. RIVER BASIN COMM’N (Sept. 13, 2017), 
http://www.nj.gov/drbc/programs/natural/ (last updated Nov. 30, 2017). 
79 ZIMMERMAN, supra note 21, at 249. 
80 32 D.C. Reg. 7393 (Dec. 20, 1985); 1985 Va. Acts 1095; see 49 U.S.C. § 49106(a) (2012) 
(describing the Authority). 
81 40 U.S.C. § 14301(b)(1) (2012); see infra Section III.A (describing the history and structure 
of the ARC). 
82 A 2010 executive order created the Gulf Coast Ecosystem Restoration Task Force. Exec. 
Order No. 13,554, 75 Fed. Reg. 62,313, 62,313-14 (Oct. 8, 2010). This Task Force was dissolved and its 
work was taken on by the newly formed the Gulf Coast Ecosystem Restoration Council two years 
later. Exec. Order No. 13,626, 77 Fed. Reg. 56,749, 56,749-50 (Sept. 13, 2012). 
83 Exec. Order No. 13,340, 69 Fed. Reg. 29,043 (May 20, 2004); Exec. Order No. 13,632, 77 
Fed. Reg. 74,341 (Dec. 14, 2012); Exec. Order No. 13,508, 74 Fed. Reg. 23,099 (May 15, 2009); GREAT 
LAKES RESTORATION INITIATIVE, ACTION PLAN II (2014), https://www.glri.us//actionplan/
pdfs/glri-action-plan-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/6NBE-77SC] (observing that the Great Lakes 
Restoration Initiative has been a catalyst for federal agency coordination); see infra Section IV.A 
(discussing the Chesapeake Bay Program). 
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and other pollutants,84 and it built regional, multistate responses to climate 
change into the Clean Power Plan.85 The DOT has focused on “megaregions,” 
with working groups of state, local, and private actors engaging in regional 
planning across jurisdictional lines.86 And EPA, DOT, and HUD formed an 
interagency Partnership for Sustainable Communities that collaborates with 
state and local governments on a regional basis to foster affordable housing 
and transportation and reduce pollution.87 
*      *      * 
As this brief overview suggests, regional governance assumes many 
different forms. One might well ask whether it is productive, or even 
reasonable, to consider interstate collaborations, federal divisions, and joint 
undertakings all as parts of our regionalism. Before returning to the present, 
the Article surveys the work of various approaches to regionalism across the 
twentieth century. In broad strokes, regional governance has progressed in 
accordance with the taxonomy above: although no regional form fully replaces 
its predecessors, interstate collaboration has given way to federal regionalism, 
which has in turn given way to state–federal hybridity. Together, these three 
regional forms have mediated American federalism and forged the distinctive 
shape of our administrative state. 
II. FROM STATE TO NATION: PLANNING THE NEW DEAL 
Throughout American history, regions—usually traveling under the label 
“sections”88—have been sites of resistance to the federal government. Regional 
interests and identities have given force to arguments for states’ rights, with 
commentators noting that state sovereignty has “never been a vital issue except 
when a whole section stood behind the challenging state.”89 In the extreme case, 
 
84 Visibility–Regional Planning Organizations, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/
visibility/visibility-regional-planning-organizations [https://perma.cc/B4KK-BJSZ]; see also What is the Ozone 
Transport Commission, OZONE TRANSP. COMM’N, http://www.otcair.org/ [https://perma.cc/6MCF-45CV]. 
85 See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility 
Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662, 64,838-40 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60). 
86 Megaregions and Multi-Jurisdictional Planning, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., https://www.
fhwa.dot.gov/planning/megaregions/ [https://perma.cc/JS2E-9VU4] [hereinafter DOT, Megaregions] 
(“Megaregion planning involves transportation planning and decision making that is executed across 
boundaries for mutual benefit.”); see infra Section IV.A. 
87 About Us, PARTNERSHIP FOR SUSTAINABLE COMMUNITIES, https://www.sustainable
communities.gov/mission/about-us [http://perma.cc/H587-3862]; see also, e.g., Regional Innovation 
Program, 82 Fed. Reg. 3131 (Jan. 11, 2017) (to be codified at 13 C.F.R. pt. 312). 
88 See Limerick, supra note 9 (describing the different connotations of “regions” and “sections”). 
89 FREDERICK JACKSON TURNER, THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SECTIONS IN AMERICAN 
HISTORY 39 (1932); see also id. at 194 (“[T]here was hardly a case of the serious assertion of state 
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sectional alliances have yielded threats of secession, from New England and the 
Hartford Convention to the Confederacy and the Civil War. On a more 
quotidian plane, multistate efforts have forestalled federal regulation. Yet despite 
the well-grounded understanding that regions bolster state power against the 
center, regions have also facilitated the growth of the federal government. 
A complete history of American regionalism’s competing centrifugal and 
centripetal tendencies would begin long before the twentieth century, but an 
account of regionalism’s influence on the contemporary administrative state 
can fruitfully pick up in the 1920s, when a regionalist movement began to 
celebrate the “promise of regionalism.”90 For members of this movement, 
regions were at once organic communities and governance units that might 
stave off federal intervention. Resisting cultural homogenization, artists, 
sociologists, historians, lawyers, and others located the “real” United States in 
its regions. Resisting the expansion of federal bureaucracy, these critics 
advocated regional solutions for problems exceeding individual states’ capacity. 
If particular interest in regions sprang from their perceived utility in 
resisting centralization, however, regionalism soon became a tool of the New 
Deal. Both regional accommodations within and regional administration of 
new federal programs facilitated a substantial expansion of federal 
bureaucracy. The twentieth-century administrative state was thus propelled 
forward by strategies designed to resist it. By the 1940s, commentators were 
voicing a new understanding of regionalism as constitutive of nationalism, 
and early stirrings of regionalism as resistance to centralization persisted 
principally within rather than outside of federal administration. 
A. Regions Against the Federal Government 
Widespread belief in “the promise of regionalism” arose in the 1920s and 
1930s.91 Geographers surveyed topography to discover the nation’s natural 
divisions, while geologists searched beneath, climatologists looked above, and 
ecologists studied flora and fauna to ascertain areal units.92 Anthropologists, 
 
sovereignty except where sectional cooperation gave it force.”); WILLIAM B. MUNRO, THE 
INVISIBLE GOVERNMENT 140 (1928) (“Books relating to American history and government are full 
of references to states’ rights and state sovereignty, but find me an instance in American history 
where either issue has ever been raised by a single state, or otherwise than by a group of states!”). 
90 LEWIS MUMFORD, THE GOLDEN DAY 158 (1926). 
91 See generally ROBERT L. DORMAN, REVOLT OF THE PROVINCES: THE REGIONALIST 
MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1920–1945 (2003) (exploring the regionalist movement of the 1920s and 
1930s); Michael C. Steiner, Regionalism in the Great Depression, 73 GEOGRAPHICAL REV. 430, 430 
(1983) (discussing regionalism across a variety of fields, including political science, art, sociology, 
architecture, and history). 
92 E.g., ODUM & MOORE, supra note 17, at 29; CHARLES O. PAULLIN, ATLAS OF THE 
HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY OF THE UNITED STATES (1932) (describing the division of the United 
States into regions based on factors such as physical landforms, climate, soil, and natural resources). 
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sociologists, and linguists measured dialect, race, religion, occupation, and 
other characteristics to define regional populations.93 Historians retold the 
nation’s past as a story of sectional struggle,94 while artists, critics, and 
folklorists celebrated, revived, and sometimes invented local culture and 
traditions.95 Economists and political scientists proposed industrial, political, 
and economic regions, and elected officials and administrators took up the 
idea of regional planning, beginning at the metropolitan level.96 The zest for 
regionalism—an enthusiasm some came to understand as tantamount to “a 
cult”97—resulted in part from the conjunction of these many undertakings, as 
a “new science of the region” was born.98 
The passion of the regional movement also reflected a reaction against 
perceived government centralization and cultural homogenization. During 
World War I, the federal government had assumed a variety of new 
responsibilities, from managing railroads to managing labor relations,99 and the 
1920s saw the rise of national media, including radio, newsreels, and magazines 
like Time.100 For some, it was a “paradox that the development of regional 
analysis has paralleled the growth of world-wide communication and trade, the 
 
93 E.g., ODUM & MOORE, supra note 17, at 23; HOWARD W. ODUM, SOUTHERN REGIONS 
OF THE UNITED STATES (1936); RUPERT B. VANCE, HUMAN GEOGRAPHY OF THE SOUTH: A 
STUDY IN REGIONAL RESOURCES AND HUMAN ADEQUACY (1935); WALTER PRESCOTT WEBB, 
THE GREAT PLAINS (1931). 
94 E.g., VERNON L. PARRINGTON, MAIN CURRENTS IN AMERICAN THOUGHT (1927); 
TURNER, supra note 89; WEBB, supra note 93. 
95 E.g., LUCY LOCKWOOD HAZARD, THE FRONTIER IN AMERICAN LITERATURE (1927); 
RALPH L. RUSK, THE LITERATURE OF THE MIDDLE WESTERN FRONTIER (1925); Mary Austin, 
Regionalism in American Fiction, 21 ENGL. J. 97, 99-100 (1932); see also Earl H. Rovit, The Regions 
Versus the Nation: Critical Battle of the Thirties, 13 MISS. Q. 89, 91-95 (1960) (describing interest in 
regionalism across a variety of disciplines in the 1920s and 1930s); Steiner, supra note 91, at 430 
(“During [the 1930s] regionalism was widely and urgently discussed by artists, folklorists, social 
scientists, planners, architects, and engineers.”). 
96 E.g., COMM. ON REG’L PLAN OF N.Y. & ITS ENVIRONS, I REGIONAL PLAN OF NEW YORK 
AND ITS ENVIRONS (1929) (providing a development plan for the New York City region); BENTON 
MACKAYE, THE NEW EXPLORATION: A PHILOSOPHY OF REGIONAL PLANNING (1928) 
(advocating regional planning). 
97 Louis Wirth, The Limitations of Regionalism, in REGIONALISM IN AMERICA, supra note 14, at 
381, 391-92. 
98 ODUM, supra note 93; ODUM & MOORE, supra note 17, at 4; see also DORMAN, supra note 
91, at 276 (“Regionalists themselves aspired self-consciously to become a movement.”). 
99 BARRY D. KARL, THE UNEASY STATE: THE UNITED STATES FROM 1915 TO 1945, 52 (1983). 
100 Id. at 78 (“What gives the decade of the twenties its particular cast is the rapid development 
of the new communications media, which made people conscious that their society was in 
transition.”); MUNRO, supra note 89, at 160-61 (“The same magazines are read, the same radio music 
listened to, the same movies looked at . . . . They are insidiously nationalizing the cut of our clothes, 
the interior decoration of our homes, the brands of food that we consume, and even the varieties of 
slang that our youngsters use.”). 
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emergence of cosmopolitan culture, and the ideology of One World.”101 But 
many commentators regarded the interest in regionalism as directly responsive 
to “the nationalizing, homogenizing urban-industrial complex.”102 A variety of 
proponents self-consciously embraced regionalism as an answer to looming 
“vaster and vaster federal bureaucracies” and a “centralizing state.”103 
Looking to regionalism as a response to threats of government 
centralization and cultural homogenization, proponents made a series of 
claims about regions both in their own right and, especially, vis-à-vis the 
states and federal government. Most relevant here, they argued that regions 
were natural, organic units of the country and that regional governance could 
empower the states and forestall centralization by addressing problems that 
exceeded individual states’ capacity without resort to federal intervention. 
First, many posited regions as the “real” internal divisions of the vast 
United States.104 The country as a whole could not be understood without 
 
101 Rupert B. Vance, The Regional Concept as a Tool for Social Research, in REGIONALISM IN 
AMERICA, supra note 14, at 119. 
102 DORMAN, supra note 91, at xii. 
103 Id. at 129 (quoting Vernon Parrington and J. Frank Dobie); Barry D. Karl, Constitution and 
Central Planning: The Third New Deal Revisited, 1988 SUP. CT. REV. 163, 170 (“If the experience of 
World War I had emboldened planners eager to use the federal government to manage nationwide 
programs, it nonetheless increased the fears of those who saw in the federal government a threat to 
local autonomy and individual control.”). 
Southern Agrarian Donald Davidson, for instance, diagnosed regionalism as “an American 
expression of dissatisfaction with the culture, or pseudo-culture that has accompanied the diffusion 
of industrialism.” DONALD DAVIDSON, THE ATTACK ON LEVIATHAN: REGIONALISM AND 
NATIONALISM IN THE UNITED STATES 10-11 (1938); see also DONALD DAVIDSON ET AL., I’LL TAKE 
MY STAND: THE SOUTH AND THE AGRARIAN TRADITION (1930) (defending a Southern agrarian 
culture and tradition). From a different vantage point, social critic Lewis Mumford argued that, in 
“a period when the uniformities of the machine civilization were being overstressed, regionalism 
served to emphasize compensatory organic elements: above all, those differences that arise out of 
geographic, historic, and cultural peculiarities.” LEWIS MUMFORD, THE CULTURE OF CITIES, 305-
06 (1970). See generally ODUM & MOORE, supra note 17, at 630 (“[M]any observers . . . conclude[d] 
that the chief dilemma of the time was that of society’s ability to accommodate its natural capacities 
and institutions to the artificial demands of bigness, speed, technology, change.”); TURNER, supra 
note 89, at 325 (“[T]oday it may fairly be asked whether all these forces of centralization of power 
in Washington have promoted national unity and consolidation, or on the other hand have increased 
sectional expression.”); Michael C. Steiner, The Significance of Turner’s Sectional Thesis, 10 W. HIST. 
Q. 437, 440 (1979) (“[A]s the sectional thesis reached its fullest expression in the 1920s, memories of 
what seemed to be a stable community with a distinctive sense of place provided an image of order 
and security in the face of rapid social change.”). 
104 See, e.g., Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution, 34 
YALE L.J. 685, 729 (1925) (“Our regions are realities. Political thinking must respond to these 
realities.”); Munro, supra note 16, at 123 (“We think of the states as the component parts of the 
Nation because they are recognized political entities; [but] we persistently overlook those sections 
or regions of the country which are our real economic units even though they are not given 
recognition as such by constitutions and laws.”); see also FESLER, supra note 11, at 33 (“In a sense, the 
South is more real than Alabama, the Middle West more real than Kansas, New England more real 
than Vermont.”); DAVID LILIENTHAL, TVA: DEMOCRACY ON THE MARCH 155 (1944) (suggesting 
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appreciating its component parts, these commentators argued, yet state 
borders were largely artificial.105 Regions, not states, reflected natural 
geographical or cultural unities and were the true building blocks of American 
history, politics, and contemporary society. Famous for his 1893 study of the 
frontier, historian Frederick Jackson Turner began in the early twentieth century 
to describe the frontier as a “moving section,” and he posited the now-closed 
frontier and the section as “two of the most fundamental factors in American 
history.”106 Turner argued that the United States was in fact a “congeries of 
sections” and that the country’s past could only be understood in sectional 
terms.107 For him and others, including Southern Agrarian Donald Davidson, 
both states and the federal government were merely institutional vehicles, 
even masks, for sectional interests.108 Other commentators who focused on 
the deep reality of regions recast Turner’s divisive sectionalism as a more 
harmonious, pluralistic regionalism: a nation as large as the United States 
necessarily comprised distinct cultures, but they could be mutually enriching 
if all were allowed to flourish. Regionalists like Lewis Mumford thus 
anticipated a New Deal governance paradigm by insisting that the proper 
stance was to recognize and celebrate regional diversity, rather than to deny 
it in the service of a monolithic nationalism or to fear it as a prelude to 
renewed sectional conflict.109 
 
newspapers are more “realistic” than the Congressional Record because they report on regions rather 
than states in Congress). 
105 Or, if not artificial, problematic. See, e.g., Wirth, supra note 97, at 385 (describing how the 
use of rivers as both state boundary lines and arteries of transportation “create[d] complicated 
interstate problems of administration” as major cities emerged on state boundaries). 
106 TURNER, supra note 89, at 183. 
107 Id. at 39, 183; see also id. at 194 (“As soon as we cease to be dominated by the political map, divided 
into rectangular states, and by the form of the Constitution in contrast with the actualities, groups of states 
and geographic provinces, rather than individual states, press upon the historian’s attention.”). 
108 See id. at 321 (“[S]tate sovereignty was never influential except as a constitutional shield for 
the section.”); see also DAVIDSON, supra note 103, at 26 (“[T]he mask of state sovereignty is less 
important in national history, because it is less efficacious than the other great mask: the mask of 
national pretensions, or the use of the Federal mechanism itself as the disguise of a sectional 
program.”); TURNER, supra note 89, at 39, 287-88. 
109 Mumford, for instance, called for “intercourse and reciprocity” among various regions, 
arguing that appreciating the “diversity of regional cultures” would eschew universalizing “the 
parochialism” of one particular place. Lewis Mumford, Toward a New Regionalism, NEW REPUBLIC, 
Mar. 25, 1931, at 158. John Neihardt similarly argued that it would be “idiotic” to “attempt to fuse 
our various sectional cultures . . . into a common national culture” and the nation should instead 
“emphasize . . . the vital significance of what each section has to offer.” DORMAN, supra note 91, at 
116-17. Even Davidson and Turner gestured to this possibility. See DAVIDSON, supra note 103, at 107 
(explaining that regionalism is “not an anti-national force but the condition itself of nationalism in 
a country as large and as notably diverse in its geographic divisions as our country is”); TURNER, 
supra note 89, at 338 (arguing that “sections serve as restraints upon a deadly uniformity” and “cross-
fertilize each other” and that a “national vision must take account of the existence of these varied 
sections; otherwise the national vision will be only a sectional mirage”). 
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Second, commentators began to argue that, if regions were in a cultural or 
political sense more “real” than states or the federal government, then regions 
were useful, underutilized sites of governance. Lying between too-small states 
and the too-big nation, regions seemed to offer a Goldilocks solution to a 
variety of problems. For many, regionalism held out the particularly notable 
promise of fending off federal bureaucracy: even as industrialization 
underscored the limits of state governance, regional organization might 
forestall otherwise-inevitable centralization. Some went so far as to press for 
the establishment of regional governments. William Munro, for instance, 
argued for “full-fledged governmental entities standing midway between the 
states and the nation.”110 These “regional governments” would not be mere 
administrative districts. Instead, so that they might offer “a buffer of 
protection against all-pervading national centralization,” they would “be 
given a definite endowment of autonomous power and equipped with both 
executive and legislative organs of government.”111 
More modestly, many commentators advocated forms of interstate 
cooperation that might yield regional governance without regional 
governments. The interstate compact received particular attention, and 
newfound uses.112 Although authorized from the Founding, interstate 
compacts had been used sparingly until the twentieth century, and the 
overwhelming majority had settled boundary disputes. In the 1920s, however, 
a burst of compacting activity suggested new scope for the device. 
Administrative arrangements like the Port Authority of New York and the 
Colorado River Compact “reflect[ed] the emphasis on a positive provision for 
 
110 MUNRO, supra note 89, at 157; see also id. at 156 (“Problems which are sectional in character cannot 
be contracted into state or enlarged into national problems by mere dicta of constitutions and courts.”). 
111 Id. at 130-32; see also Munro, supra note 16, at 128 (arguing that “[p]eople will not starve or 
suffer continued injustice or forever tolerate economic inequities in the name of checks and balances, 
states’ rights, or reserved powers” and that the alternative to regional governance would be “a gradual 
enlargement of Federal jurisdiction, with all the dangers that such expansion may eventually 
involve”). Others advocating regional government in this period saw it as a replacement for states. 
See, e.g., WILLIAM Y. ELLIOT, THE NEED FOR CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM (1935) (suggesting that 
regions should replace states as political units); W. Brooke Graves, The Future of the American States, 
30 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 24, 32-33 (1936) (describing the growth of scholarly support for regionalism 
as an alternative to state and federal government); Edward M. Barrows, U.R.A.,—A New American 
Nation, NEW OUTLOOK (May 1933), at 17 (“Today most of us live and work together as units of a 
geographic region, and only secondarily as citizens of a state.”); see also Burdette G. Lewis, 
Regionalism: A Plan for Uniting the States More Effectively, FORUM (Mar. 1933), at 138 (proposing that 
the states “should be organized through the Compact Clause of our Federal Constitution” into six 
regions, with representative regional councils and courts). 
112 See James W. Fesler, Federal Administrative Regions, 30 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 257, 259 (1936) 
(“Unwilling to further the aggrandizement of power by the federal government, many states have 
organized regionally for the consideration of regional problems. Interstate compacts represent the 
most formalized method of regional cooperation.”). 
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continuing and flexible adjustment of public services to needs that cannot be 
adequately met or dealt with at all by ordinary State or Federal Action.”113 
Elaborating this potential, Felix Frankfurter and James Landis argued in 
a 1925 Yale Law Journal article that regional “interstate adjustments” were a 
means of meeting emerging problems without aggrandizing the federal 
government.114 While state attempts to resolve questions of interstate concern 
would be inadequate, and national action would be “either unavailable or 
excessive,”115 regions might provide the solution.116 For Frankfurter and 
Landis, administrative government was required but should rely on 
“inventive powers exacted from modern State legislatures” rather than an 
accretion of federal bureaucracy.117 Creative uses of the interstate compact, 
especially, seemed to portend the states might retain vitality through regional 
collaboration: “The imaginative adaptation of the compact idea should add 
considerably to resources available to statesmen in the solution of problems 
presented by the growing interdependence, social and economic, of groups of 
States forming distinct regions,” they argued.118 In particular, they suggested 
that “the New England States, the Middle Atlantic States, the Pacific Coast 
States, and similar groupings” might “each evolve, through compact, common 
industrial standards, thereby recognizing diversities not coincident with the 
capricious boundaries of forty-eight States nor yet to be resolved by a flat 
common denominator nation-wide in its operation.”119 
 
113 NRC REPORT, supra note 16, at 36; see also id. at 41, 70 (discussing the Port Authority and 
Colorado River compacts). 
114 Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 104, at 708. Their legal argument was in dialogue with 
Turner’s historical work. They cited his essays on regional interests, id., and he approvingly noted 
their proposal for interstate collaboration, TURNER, supra note 89, at 201-02. 
115 Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 104, at 707; see also ODUM & MOORE, supra note 17, at 243 
(“The states, too small, too historically incidental, too artificially set apart, manifestly are inadequate 
units for measurement or administration. Yet historically, legally, constitutionally, statistically, they are 
organic divisions which it is not possible to ignore as fundamental units of both appraisal and 
administration. The states, then, represent one horn of the national dilemma. The other extreme is the 
federal centralization of control, which is equally as realistic a trend as the states are historical fact.”). 
116 In this sense, Frankfurter’s regionalism was of a piece with his view of a pluralistic administrative 
state. See Jeremy K. Kessler, The Administrative Origins of Modern Civil Liberties Law, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 
1083, 1115-18 (2014) (describing Frankfurter’s statist yet pluralistic ideology with respect to conscientious 
objectors); Jeremy K. Kessler, The Struggle for Administrative Legitimacy, 129 HARV. L. REV. 718, 736 (2016) 
(book review) [hereinafter Kessler, Administrative Legitimacy] (“Frankfurter’s legal advocacy on behalf of 
critics of American power was in keeping with his own thoroughly nationalist and statist ideology. 
Frankfurter simply believed that the legal accommodation of dissenters was one aspect of building a 
strong state in a diverse, conflict-ridden nation.”). 
117 Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 104, at 708. 
118 Id. at 729. 
119 Id.; see also id. at 708 (“Collective legislative action through the instrumentality of compact by 
States constituting a region furnishes the answer.”). Justice Frankfurter subsequently celebrated the 
regional compact from the bench. See West Virginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22, 27-28 (1951) (noting 
the Court’s previous suggestion that “a problem such as that involved here is ‘more likely to be wisely 
2018] Our Regionalism 401 
Frankfurter and Landis were not alone in seeing both regulatory potential 
and an evolving role for states through collaboration. An issue of State 
Government magazine, for example, cited the “chaos” of states “functioning as 
forty-eight sovereign nations” and argued that “[e]ither many of the 
remaining functions of the states will rapidly pass into federal control, or else 
the states must hasten to cooperate with each other as they have never 
cooperated before.”120 W. Brooke Graves was blunter: “The states must, in 
the slang phrase, ‘put up or shut up’ . . . .”121 
B. Regions Within the Federal Government 
Although commentators in the 1920s and 1930s argued that regions were 
places where problems exceeding state competence could be addressed without 
federal intervention, regionalism soon proved congenial to the burgeoning 
project of federal administration itself. Interstate regionalism persisted, but with 
the New Deal it came to be overshadowed by regional projects involving the 
federal government. As the federal government “moved uncertainly and 
threateningly into positions of control over the distribution of the nation’s 
resources” in the 1930s,122 the region became a critical administrative tool. 
The turn to regionalism was deliberate. As contemporary commentators 
appreciated, while the Roosevelt Administration had federal regional 
precedents to draw on,123 it was “the first to take a consciously regional 
 
solved by cooperative study and by conference and mutual concession on the part of representatives of the 
States so vitally interested in it than by proceedings in any court however constituted’” and recognizing 
that “[t]he growing interdependence of regional interests, calling for regional adjustments, has brought 
extensive use of compacts)” (quoting New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 297 (1920))). 
120 Graves, supra note 111, at 49-50 (quoting the March 1935 issue of State Government). 
121 Id. at 45; see also id. at 46 (“Informal cooperation between neighboring states may 
accomplish much; where a more formal agreement is required, there is the possibility of the 
interstate compact . . . .”); FESLER, supra note 11, at 39 (noting that “comprehensive inter-area 
cooperation” is often “a method of lobbying against accretion of powers by the next higher level of 
government”); JON C. TEAFORD, THE RISE OF THE STATES: EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN STATE 
GOVERNMENT 144 (2002) (“During the 1930s . . . [t]he states faced a dynamic federal government, 
and in response they closed ranks to a degree unprecedented in the nation’s history.”). 
122 Karl, supra note 103, at 171. 
123 Precedents for federal regional organization included field offices for federal departments 
such as Interior, Justice, Treasury, and War and the Progressive Era Federal Reserve Districts. See, 
e.g., ELIZABETH M. SANDERS, ROOTS OF REFORM: FARMERS, WORKERS, AND THE AMERICAN 
STATE, 1877-1917, at 238-39, 258 (1999) (discussing the creation of the Federal Reserve System); 
Federal Reserve Districts, FED. RES. BANK OF S.F. (May 2001), http://www.frbsf.org/
education/publications/doctor-econ/2001/may/federal-reserve-districts/ [https://perma.cc/CXZ4-
LR2R] (describing the placement of twelve Federal Reserve District Banks in 1913). But the New 
Deal deployed federal regionalism on an unprecedented scale. Just as much recent scholarship has 
documented the long history of the American administrative state without denying particularly 
expansive and formative New Deal developments, so too the precursors of regionalism as a tool of 
the federal government do not gainsay the New Deal’s pronounced deployment of regionalism. 
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approach,” popularizing “the term regional to such an extent that it appears 
almost as often on the lips of the populace as in the blueprints of the 
experts.”124 This federal regionalism manifested in two main respects: 
substantive provisions and administrative organization. Many of the most 
ambitious new federal programs were either written or executed in a regionally 
differentiated manner, and they were also administered through regionally 
dispersed offices of federal agencies. Regional accommodation and regional 
administration were intertwined, if often differently motivated: decentralized 
regional administration eased regional variation in the substance of federal 
programs, while regional demands for accommodation justified regional 
administration as a procedural matter. Together, these regional approaches 
facilitated the New Deal’s significant expansion of federal regulation. 
1. Accommodation 
Major New Deal programs were designed to look different in different 
regions of the country. In particular, they were designed to leave untouched 
the South’s racial order.125 To appease southern members of Congress, laws 
touching labor relations ensured “that southern employers could continue to 
draw without hindrance on the still-enormous supply of inexpensive and 
vulnerable black labor.”126 Significant new federal programs created by the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act, the National Industrial Recovery Act, the 
National Labor Relations Act, and the Social Security Act accommodated Jim 
Crow but in so doing also embraced regionalism more generally. Relying in 
part on the new science of regional studies that transformed the South 
“analytically into a more ordinary, if poor, region that could be melded within 
a larger American sectional mosaic,”127 New Deal programs both subsidized a 
brutal caste system and normalized a regional approach to federal law. 
New Deal legislation accommodated regional interests in three principal 
ways. Most straightforwardly—but also least commonly—federal legislation 
itself sometimes provided directly or indirectly for regional variances. For 
 
124 DAVIDSON, supra note 103, at 58-59. 
125 See RICHARD FRANKLIN BENSEL, SECTIONALISM AND AMERICAN POLITICAL 
DEVELOPMENT 1880-1980, at 147-55 (1984). See generally Ira KATZNELSON, FEAR ITSELF (2013); 
ROBERT C. LIEBERMAN, SHIFTING THE COLOR LINE (1998). 
126 KATZNELSON, supra note 125, at 163 (describing how southern Congressmen “ensur[ed] 
that key New Deal bills on subjects sensitive for the South . . . would be adapted to meet the test of 
not disturbing the region’s racial structure”). 
127 Id. at 168; see also, e.g., DAVID M. POTTER, THE SOUTH AND THE SECTIONAL CONFLICT 
7-8 (1968) (noting that Odum’s Southern Regions of the United States “mapped, measured, and charted 
the plight of the agricultural South” without showing the particular plight of black Americans, so 
that “the most careful reader of this encyclopedic survey of Southern economic and social conditions 
could almost have overlooked the fact that a biracial system prevailed in the South”). 
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example, in recognition of the fact that two-thirds of southern black 
employees were farmworkers or domestic workers, the National Labor 
Relations Act excluded “any individual employed as an agricultural laborer,” 
with the committee report adding that “domestic servant[s]” were also 
excluded from protection as “employees.”128 
Second and more common, federal legislation was silent about regional 
accommodations but shifted decisionmaking authority to federal executive 
officials, who in turn provided for regional adjustments. Some of the most 
significant regional variation during the New Deal accordingly came from the 
federal executive branch, marking an important change in how sectional 
tensions might be resolved in the United States: instead of hashing out 
regional interests on the floor of Congress or leaving matters entirely to the 
states, open-ended federal laws left regional implications to be resolved by 
the executive branch. No longer did regional interests need to prevail as a 
matter of uniform national policy within Congress; instead, regional interests 
could be pressed in the course of execution, with the President or federal 
agencies recognizing a variety of discrete regional differences.129 Once again, 
the white South was the primary beneficiary of this administrative flexibility 
throughout the New Deal period. For instance, the National Industrial 
Recovery Act delegated to the President the ability to define which industries 
would receive the protections of industrial codes and to recognize regional 
wage differentials, and FDR’s executive orders recognized “traditional 
differentials” so as not “to impair southern industry.”130 
A third approach to regional accommodation was the delegation of policy 
formulation to state and local officials.131 Cooperative federalism twinned 
substantive accommodation of regional interests with decentralized 
administration. For example, the states were given authority to determine 
support levels for both unemployment insurance and Aid to Dependent 
 
128 JAMES R. WATSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 
EXCLUSION OF AGRICULTURAL EMPLOYEES FROM THE NATIONAL LABOR ACT OF 1935 AND 
THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT OF 1938, 1, 4 (1966); see KATZNELSON, supra note 125, at 260. 
129 See BENSEL, supra note 125, at 148-49. 
130 KATZNELSON, supra note 125, at 241-42; see also RICHARD PARKER, JOHN KENNETH 
GALBRAITH 65 (2005) (“Section 7 was ‘reinterpreted’ so that no more allotment checks would go to 
sharecroppers directly.”). 
131 See BENSEL, supra note 125, at 149 (identifying “cooperative federalism” as a form of 
decentralization that “allowed national policies to vary widely in response to differences in regional politics”); 
KATZNELSON, supra note 125, at 163 (describing how New Deal policies were implemented with 
“decentralization of responsibility that placed administrative discretion in the hands of state and local officials 
whenever possible”). See generally JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION 
299 (2012) (noting that “federal regulation, welfare-state provision, and central government expenditures 
have grown exponentially” without a corresponding growth in the federal bureaucracy because state and 
local officials are used as “the ground-level implementers of federal statutes”). 
404 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 166: 377 
Children pursuant to the Social Security Act.132 States also assumed a 
dominant role under the Agricultural Adjustment Administration,133 the 
Civil Works Administration,134 the Federal Emergency Relief 
Administration,135 the National Recovery Administration and Public Works 
Administration,136 the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation,137 and the Works 
Progress Administration.138 Through these cooperative federalism programs, 
regional variances emerged within federal law. As with the shift within the 
federal government from Congress to the executive branch as the locus of 
regional accommodation, the embrace of cooperative federalism facilitated 
the adoption of federal policy in the first instance, but it also conditioned the 
federal government’s entry into new domestic policy domains on the 
possibility of continuing regional disuniformity. 
2. Administration 
Alongside substantive accommodations designed to expand federal 
governance without threatening powerful regional interests, New Deal programs 
were also marked by regional administration. This was linked to substantive 
regional accommodations—decentralized administration was one way of 
facilitating substantive differentiation—but it was driven by other concerns as 
well. The sheer administrative difficulty of carrying out national programs across 
“a country that is a continent”139 and quickly creating a large number of new 
federal bodies with an even larger number of new federal responsibilities 
necessitated some sort of dispersed administrative apparatus. Many of the 
academics and state and local officials populating the Roosevelt Administration, 
and FDR himself to a degree, had been swept up in the previous decade’s 
 
132 See KATZNELSON, supra note 125, at 260 (describing how Southern states provided “much 
needed funding to their poverty-stricken region while protecting the character of its racial 
arrangements”); LIEBERMAN, supra note 125, at 7 (examining the history of unemployment 
insurance and Aid to Dependent Children). 
133 EDWIN G. NOURSE ET AL., THREE YEARS OF THE AGRICULTURAL ADJUSTMENT 
ADMINISTRATION 73, 77 (1937). 
134 See generally FORREST A. WALKER, THE CIVIL WORKS ADMINISTRATION, 1933-1934 (1979). 
135 See generally HARRY L. HOPKINS, U.S. FED. EMERGENCY RELIEF ADMIN., MONTHLY 
REPORT OF THE FEDERAL EMERGENCY RELIEF ADMINISTRATION: JANUARY 1 THROUGH 
JANUARY 31, 1935 (1935). 
136 See generally JACK F. ISAKOFF, THE PUBLIC WORKS ADMINISTRATION 30 (1938); NAT’L 
RECOVERY ADMIN., REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S COMMITTEE OF INDUSTRIAL ANALYSIS (1937). 
137 See generally C. LOWELL HARRISS, HISTORY AND POLICIES OF THE HOME OWNERS’ 
LOAN CORPORATION, 140-141 (1951). 
138 See generally FED. WORKS AGENCY, REPORT ON PROGRESS OF THE WPA PROGRAM 
(1939); Graves, supra note 111, at 38. 
139 Frankfurter, supra note 15, at xv. 
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regionally focused “furore as to planning.”140 And the desire to decouple the 
expansion of federal administration (and, especially, presidential power) from the 
“toxic . . . nationalism”141 and “totalitarian specter”142 emerging from Europe, 
made regions useful vehicles of decentralization.143 
Given the various forces pushing federal administration toward regional 
organization—not to mention the hasty manner in which New Deal agencies 
were being commissioned—it is perhaps unsurprising that there was no single 
template for federal regional organization. As more than 100 different federal 
regional schemes came into use by the mid-1930s, the absence of a unified 
regional model became a concern of government officials and remained a 
preoccupation of subsequent administrations.144 Notwithstanding the lack of 
a unified model, however, three broad approaches to federal regionalism did 
emerge during this period: regionalism as administrative decentralization of 
purely federal programs; regionalism as a vehicle for intergovernmental 
coordination of cooperative federalism programs; and regionalism as an 
approach to development and planning for particular geographic areas. 
First, a good number of New Deal agencies relied on a regional structure 
in a manner long used by federal agencies: to facilitate the efficient and 
effective administration of federal law across a vast nation. Instead of turning 
to state governments, agencies including the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Farm Credit 
Administration divided the country into regions, with field offices overseen 
 
140 Stuart Chase, The Concept of Planning, Address at Round Table on Regionalism (July 11, 
1931) (on file with the University of Virginia Institute of Public Affairs) (“Not many days ago I was 
discussing the current furore as to planning with the dean of the Yale Law School. ‘Why,’ he said, ‘it 
is getting so that one is as loath to appear on the street without a Five Year Plan as without his 
trousers!’”). FDR attended this roundtable and, in introducing the proceedings, stated that he did 
“not know what ‘regionalism’ means” before going on to extol the virtues of regional planning. Address 
by Gov. Franklin D. Roosevelt of New York on State Planning, in id. Some of the many regionalists 
populating the Roosevelt Administration included Benjamin Botkin, Marshall Dimock, David 
Lilienthal, Benton MacKaye, Charles Merriam, and Arthur Morgan. See generally DORMAN, supra 
note 91, at 292 (noting a “convergence of sorts” between the regionalist movement and the New Deal). 
141 Steiner, supra note 103, at 458. 
142 Kessler, Administrative Legitimacy, supra note 116, at 733 n.65. 
143 See id.; Steiner, supra note 103, at 458. To be sure, regional organization threatened the 
opposite effect: the fascist dictator of Sinclair Lewis’s 1935 novel, It Can’t Happen Here, replaced the 
states with eight provinces, echoing contemporary media reports that Hitler was planning the 
abolition of state lines in favor of federally determined regions in Germany. SINCLAIR LEWIS, IT 
CAN’T HAPPEN HERE 143 (1935); see also Graves, supra note 111, at 32 (“[R]ecent newspaper reports 
indicate that Hitler plans the abolition of state lines in Germany.”). But regional governance as a 
departure from monolithic nationalism—rather than as a replacement for states—potentially 
rendered the expansion of federal administration less threatening. 
144 NRC REPORT, supra note 16, at 71 (finding “approximately 108 separate regional schemes 
employed by Federal administrative agencies”); see Fesler, supra note 112, at 260 (comparing federal 
regional schemes); Graves, supra note 111, at 35-38 (same); infra Section III.B. 
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by regional administrators.145 This form of federal regionalism sometimes 
entailed deliberate decentralization—for instance, the regional outposts of 
the Farm Credit Administration had significant authority to make 
decisions146—but often it was a purely administrative tool designed to leave 
decisional authority in Washington. 
A second, more significant way that regional organization came to pervade 
the federal government followed from the dramatic growth of cooperative 
federalism programs during this period. As the federal government relied on 
states to carry out a range of new domestic welfare programs, regions were 
thought to ease intergovernmental coordination. For nearly every New Deal 
cooperative federalism program, the federal government established a distinct 
regional supervisory structure. The Social Security Board was divided into 
twelve regions “to effect the utmost feasible decentralization of administration” 
while retaining ties to Washington.147 The Works Progress Administration and 
National Recovery Administration came to use nine regional offices to 
“coordinate the work of the WPA in the states of their respective regions.”148 
And the Civil Works Administration created seven regional representatives who 
“traveled constantly, in a specific number of states assigned to each, with the 
object of promoting a more effective operational relationship among federal, 
state, and local organizations.”149 Other agencies similarly superintended 
cooperative federalism with regional administrative offices.150 
In these programs, regional organization was understood to mediate state 
and federal administration, furnishing a federal presence in the field while 
allowing federal policy to be tailored to local demands or conditions. 
 
145 See AM. INST. OF BANKING, FARM CREDIT ADMINISTRATION 126-128 (1934) (describing the 
establishment of twelve “‘farm credit’ districts”); FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., FEDERAL DEPOSIT 
INSURANCE CORPORATION: THE FIRST FIFTY YEARS 74 (1984) (discussing FDIC regional offices); 
SEC, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 6-7 (1935) 
(reporting the establishment of eight regional administrative zones). 
146 See, e.g., NRC REPORT, supra note 16, at 31 (noting that the Farm Credit Administration 
referred all personnel problems and job applications received in Washington to the regional offices 
for handling). FDR’s Executive Order 6084 consolidated a variety of federal programs governing 
lending to farmers into the Farm Credit Administration, which created twelve regional boards that 
operated with significant autonomy. Exec. Order No. 6084 (Mar. 27, 1933), reprinted in 12 U.S.C. 
§ 636 (1934). Although this twelve-region, decentralized structure echoed the Federal Reserve 
System’s structure, the two agencies pursued opposite paths to regional boundaries: The Federal 
Reserve sought “economic unity” within districts, while the Farm Credit Administration sought 
agricultural heterogeneity “so that no district would be completely dependent on the success or 
failure of one . . . crop.” NRC REPORT, supra note 16, at 74. 
147 SOC. SEC. BD., SIXTH ANN. REP. 15 (1941). 
148 FED. WORKS AGENCY, supra note 138, at 81; NAT’L RECOVERY ADMIN., REPORT OF THE 
PRESIDENT’S COMMITTEE OF INDUSTRIAL ANALYSIS 62 (1937) (reporting the appointment of 
nine regional directors). 
149 WALKER, supra note 134, at 72. 
150 See, e.g., NRC REPORT, supra note 16, at 221-23 (depicting regions used by federal agencies). 
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Although the schemes generally furnished leverage for states within federal 
programs, in a few instances regional offices came to supplant the states. Thus, 
the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation, a state–federal venture, established 
eleven regional offices in 1934 upon finding that supervision of nationwide 
activity in Washington “proved inadequate.”151 At first states retained 
substantial independence, subject to regional oversight, but regional offices 
gradually assumed greater operating responsibility, and between 1940 and 1942 
the state offices were abolished and regional offices took over their functions.152 
A final approach to regional administration involved government 
commissions and authorities that reflected the era’s preoccupation with 
planning. These New Deal organizations were the most distinctively regional 
of regional administrative forms—not nationwide divisions of federal 
agencies, but bodies located in particular suprastate areas and charged with 
attending specifically to development in those areas. Some were instigated by 
the federal government but governed by state officials. For instance, in 1934, 
with the support of the National Planning Board (subsequently the National 
Resources Committee153), the New England Regional Planning Commission 
and the Pacific Northwest Regional Planning Commission were established 
to capitalize on regional identity, culture, and environmental unities in 
furtherance of a national planning agenda.154 Other approaches to regional 
 
151 HARRISS, supra note 137, at 141 (“Before many months had passed . . . the centralized 
collection arrangement proved inadequate, especially for directing loan servicing on an individual 
basis. In 1934, therefore, eleven regional offices were established, staffed in part with headquarters’ 
personnel familiar with the problems of the individual regions.”). 
152 Id. at 141. 
153 In 1934, the National Planning Board was replaced by the National Resources Board, which 
included members of the cabinet. Exec. Order No. 6777 (1934). Then, in 1935, the National 
Resources Board became the National Resources Committee. Exec. Order No. 7065 (1935). Because 
the NIRA had been declared unconstitutional in Schechter Poultry, this committee derived its 
authority from the Emergency Relief Appropriations Act of 1935. Ultimately, pursuant to the 
Reorganization Act of 1939, FDR reconstituted the National Resources Committee as the National 
Resources Planning Board, which persisted until congressional termination in 1943. 
Notwithstanding these many title changes, the committee’s mandate remained fairly consistent. It 
was to create reports and programs for national planning with respect to both natural resources and 
human concerns and to facilitate coordination of federal, state, and local government. See Exec. 
Order No. 6777 (1934) (“The functions of the Board shall be to prepare and present to the President 
a program and plan of procedure dealing with the physical, social, governmental, and economic 
aspects of public policies . . . . The program and plan shall include the coordination of projects of 
Federal, State, and local governments . . . .”); Exec. Order No. 7065 (1935) (“[The Committee shall] 
collect, prepare and make available to the President, with recommendations, such plans, data and 
information as may be helpful to a planned development and use of land, water, and other national 
resources, . . . [and shall] consult and cooperate with agencies of the Federal Government, with the 
States and municipalities or agencies thereof . . . .”). 
154 NRC REPORT, supra note 16, at 117-35; see, e.g., id. at 121 (discussing New England as the 
“geographical region east of the Hudson Valley,” the “historical region of the Yankee,” the “ethical 
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planning unfolded within particular federal agencies. The Agricultural 
Adjustment Administration began to emphasize a “regional approach” to 
planning given “variation in soils, climate, and surface features, crop and 
livestock combinations, income by source, relative productivity, accessibility 
to markets, and other minor factors,” and the Federal Emergency Relief 
Administration established a Division of Sectional Economic Research in 
recognition of the fact that “the Nation consists of many economic sections, 
each of which possesses definite interests and a unique sectional economy.”155 
The period’s most celebrated regional “[p]lanning and [d]evelopment 
[a]gency” was the Tennessee Valley Authority.156 Created as a public–private 
hybrid—a government corporation “clothed with the power of Government 
but possessed of the flexibility and initiative of a private enterprise,” as FDR 
put it to Congress157—the TVA was also a regional novelty, a federal entity 
that existed in only one area of the country. Moreover, the region was drawn 
around the Tennessee River Valley and encompassed portions of seven states 
instead of tracking state lines.158 Charged with a variety of functions, 
including water control, power development, and agricultural and industrial 
development, the TVA was granted substantial autonomy. It was understood 
to mark a “reversal of the proposition that the incompetence of local 
government in performing even local area functions justifies much of the 
transference of power to higher levels of government” and to stand instead 
for the proposition that “incompetent coordination of functions at 
Washington forces devolution of powers to quasi-autonomous regional 
authorities.”159 If certain local ends required federal intervention, so too 
might national ends require local intervention.160 TVA Chairman David 
Lilienthal thus argued that “[m]odern regionalism . . . rests squarely upon the 
supremacy of the national interest.”161 Recognizing geographical, political, and 
cultural difference but insisting that “the solution of regional problems and 
the development of regional resources are matters of concern to the whole 
 
region of the New England conscience and of Puritanism,” and the “recreational region of rugged 
coast, tumbled mountains, crystal streams and lakes, sloping orchards, and white-pine forests”). 
155 Id. at 78-79. 
156 Id. at 83. 
157 President Franklin D. Roosevelt, President’s Message to Congress Suggesting the 
Tennessee Valley Authority (April 10, 1933). 
158 NRC REPORT, supra note 16, at 84. 
159 FESLER, supra note 11, at 96. 
160 For its own self-preservation, moreover, the TVA sought to use a “grass-roots” approach, 
utilizing “the services of state and local agencies, supplementing and stimulating, not duplicating, 
their staff or equipment.” DERTHICK, supra note 5, at 34. 
161 LILIENTHAL, supra note 104, at 155. 
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country,” New Deal regionalism would look to “harmonize regional 
advancement with the national welfare.”162 
C. Sectionalism Versus Regionalism 
By the time the United States entered World War II, regionalism had 
gone from being a creed of resistance to “vaster and vaster federal 
bureaucracies” and the “powers of a centralizing state”163 to serving as a tool 
for expanding the reach of the federal government. If 1920s regionalism was 
a cri de coeur against a growing federal bureaucracy and nationalist impulses, 
the New Deal’s regionalism was congenial to these developments. As early as 
the mid-1930s, the limits of interstate cooperation had become apparent; the 
National Resources Committee, which generally favored multistate 
collaboration, described the interstate compact as a device sometimes urged 
by those “who are attempting to avoid any public action at all.”164 Meanwhile, 
the federal government was deploying regional accommodations and regional 
organization to expand its reach. 
Regionalism therefore came to exist largely as an aspect of federal 
governance rather than an exception to it. As Lilienthal’s comments about the 
TVA and “modern regionalism” suggest, this development entailed both a 
governance paradigm of regionalism as a component of federal administration 
and a more theoretical recasting of regionalism as a component of 
nationalism. The transformation was not a mere inversion of early regionalist 
impulses, however. If regionalism now served the “national interest,” the 
national interest was itself understood to be more plural than early 
regionalists supposed. Moreover, rather than displace the states, the marked 
expansion of the federal government had gone hand-in-hand with the growth 
of government more generally. Cooperative federalism pervaded new federal 
programs, so that the pluralism celebrated within federal administration 
continued to be filtered through the states. 
 
162 Id.; see also Gordon R. Clapp, The Tennessee Valley Authority, in REGIONALISM IN AMERICA, 
supra note 14, at 317, 326 (“The very essence of the TVA idea is a strong faith in this thesis: The 
whole country benefits as each region builds a stronger economy upon the native characteristics and 
resources that mark it as a region.”). 
163 DORMAN, supra note 91, at 129 (quoting Vernon Parrington). 
164 NRC REPORT, supra note 16, at 48; see id. at 51 (suggesting that compacts should not be used 
when a problem is continuing and there is a need for new administrative “machinery” and “independent 
planning and autonomous execution”); HAROLD J. LASKI, THE AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 156 (1948) 
(“[T]he Compact Clause requires something like geological time to achieve results that are desirable.”). 
Moreover, interest in compacts had followed in part from a restrictive view of the Commerce Clause, see, 
e.g., NRC REPORT, supra note 16, at 48; Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 104, which more or less 
disappeared as a concern following NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
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As the New Deal unfolded, a variety of supportive commentators 
reframed regionalism. Seizing on early suggestions that regions could 
harmoniously coexist and enrich one another,165 scholars and public officials 
began to argue that regionalism might be constitutive of a plural nationalism. 
If in the 1920s regionalists had responded to perceived centralization and 
homogenization by valorizing regions over the nation, some regionalists in 
the 1930s began instead to fold regional pluralism into nationalism. At once 
advancing and justifying New Deal regionalism, Howard Odum, Harry 
Moore, Rupert Vance and others insisted on a semantic distinction between 
“sectionalism” and “regionalism”: while “sectionalism” was a divisive force, 
“regionalism” was instead integrative and union-bolstering.166 
The fullest expression of this regional aspiration was offered by Odum and 
Moore after the New Deal was well underway and their studies of the South had 
contributed to a variety of federal programs.167 In their 1938 tome, American 
Regionalism: A Cultural-Historical Approach to National Integration, Odum and 
Moore argued that “regionalism is in reality the opposite of its most common 
interpretation, namely, localism, sectionalism, or provincialism.”168 Whereas 
“sectionalism sees the region first and the nation afterwards,” “regionalism 
envisages the nation first, making the national culture and welfare the final 
arbiter.”169 Regionalism was the cooperative, integrative doppelganger to 
competitive, divisive sectionalism.170 Regionalism was also, however, distinct 
from “‘toxic’ European nationalism.”171 It held out the prospect of national unity 
while avoiding the specter of totalitarianism or fascism, on the one hand, and 
the destructive sectionalism of the Civil War, on the other.172 For Odum and 
 
165 See supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
166 See generally Limerick, supra note 9; cf. DANIEL J. ELAZAR, AMERICAN FEDERALISM 137-
38 (3d ed. 1984) (distinguishing sectionalism from regionalism on different lines). 
167 See ODUM & MOORE, supra note 17. 
168 Id. at 14 (emphasis omitted). 
169 Id. at 42; see also, e.g., Hedwig Hintze, Regionalism, in 13 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOC. 
SCI. 208-09 (1934) (distinguishing regionalism from sectionalism). 
170 Not all contemporaries accepted the distinction:  
In discussing the sectional problem, the social scientist is reluctant to use the 
vocabulary of the historian. The terms section and sectionalism seem to him too 
schismatic and contentious for complete acceptance. The scientist wants a scientific 
term. He wants to escape the taint of war and confusion that hangs about the older 
words. The words region and regionalism suit his purpose better.  
DAVIDSON, supra note 103, at 41. Others embraced the idea but not the vocabulary. For instance, in 1938, 
the National Folk Festival came to Washington, D.C. with an “Every Section Contributes” header. 
DORMAN, supra note 91, at 253; see also id. (quoting FDR’s comment on the festival, “In binding these 
elements into a national fabric of beauty and strength, let us keep the original fibers intact”). 
171 Steiner, supra note 91, at 458. 
172 See e.g., ODUM & MOORE, supra note 17, at 640 (describing regionalism in part as a motivation 
to resist the “natural danger of dictatorships”). See generally Kessler, Administrative Legitimacy, supra note 
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Moore, regionalism was therefore the best hope of nationalism in a plural 
society. Whereas Turner had looked backward and cast national development 
as a story of sectional conflict, Odum and Moore suggested the further 
development of the country lay in embracing regionalism.173 
Other commentators similarly found in the New Deal a regionalism that gave 
the nation pride of place. Lilienthal, for example, argued for a national 
regionalism that celebrated substantive decentralization and pluralism: 
“[C]oncern for and supremacy of the national interest distinguishes ‘regionalism’ 
from ‘sectionalism.’ Under the banner of sectionalism, states throughout our 
history have combined to support or to oppose federal action. Under the modern 
concept of regionalism, the federal government acts to meet regional needs to the 
end that the entire nation may profit.”174 Odum’s student Rupert Vance reflected 
that “the regional approach to social analysis has an integrative rather than a 
divisive function . . . for the region gains its significance only from its relation to 
a total structure. The relation that regionalism presumes to study is that of parts 
to wholes.”175 Not only was the nation logically prior to the region, but regional 
projects had to be evaluated from a national perspective. 
The National Resources Committee’s 1935 report, Regional Factors in 
National Planning and Development—hailed by Donald Davidson as “one of the 
most amazing reports ever issued by any bureau or committee of the United 
States government” insofar as it took up “a systematic consideration of the 
taboo question of sectional stress and conflict”176—likewise reframed divisive 
sectionalism as nation-bolstering regionalism.177 As Davidson’s description 
 
116, at 733 n.65 (“The use of the totalitarian specter both to explain and justify mid-twentieth-century 
political moderation is something of a leitmotif in recent American historiography.”). 
173 ODUM & MOORE, supra note 17, at 35 (“The thesis of this volume is that the promise and 
prospect of the nation in the future is, in another sense, to be found in the substitution of a realistic 
and comprehensive regionalism for the older historical sectionalism.”); id. at 39 (“Here the 
distinctions are clear between the divisive power of self-seeking sections and the integrating power 
of co-ordinate regions fabricated into a united whole. The premise of the new regionalism . . . 
assumes that the United States must not . . . become a federation of conflicting sections but a 
homogeneity of varying regions.” (emphases omitted)); see also THEODORE C. BLEGEN, GRASS 
ROOTS HISTORY 12 (1947) (“Adding up nonentities, someone has said, is like adding a column of 
zeros; the result remains zero. Add up regions that lack cultural richness and strength, and you 
cannot achieve an impressive total in terms of national culture.”). 
174 LILIENTHAL, supra note 104, at 155-56; see also id. at 147 (suggesting that decentralization 
must entail decisionmaking and not simply “errand boys” in the field); id. at 142 (noting the “hazards 
of overcentralized administration of . . . central powers”). 
175 Vance, The Regional Concept, supra note 101, at 119; see also VANCE, HUMAN GEOGRAPHY, 
supra note 93 (arguing that regions allow authentic American cultures to develop). 
176 DAVIDSON, supra note 103, at 59; see id. at 60 (“It is as if the Federal government had given 
its official sanction to the New Regionalism, and allied itself with that doctrine as a working 
philosophy in its approach to domestic affairs.”). 
177 NRC REPORT, supra note 16, at viii (“[T]he ‘Regionalism’ here discussed is not a 
Balkanization of the United States, but a better organization of our American national purposes—a 
more effective promotion of the public welfare.”). 
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suggested, sectionalism haunted the account. The Committee saw regional 
difference as irrepressible, such that the federal government could either 
harness the power of regionalism or be undone by it.178 But the Committee 
also affirmatively embraced regionalism as constitutive of a richer 
nationalism. It suggested that regionalism had recently been “recognized as a 
factor of value and importance in the encouragement of a more varied and 
richer life for the Nation” and that “the peculiar characteristics, resources, and 
contributions of the major sections of the country” should be “protected from 
invasion and suppression by ill-considered and hasty national policies.”179 
Indeed, the Committee disavowed centralization as such; regionalism 
pressed into the service of such nationalism would be, on its account, 
“pseudo” regionalism.180 Even as the report understood regionalism as an 
instrument of the federal government, it sought to discern regions that might 
inspire political identity and independent governance. The NRC appreciated 
that “[n]o citizen of Iowa would . . . readily identify himself with a region 
consisting of a combination of States such as Louisiana, Oklahoma, Iowa, and 
Missouri; no Californian ever boasted of living within the Twelfth Federal 
Reserve District; no Washingtonian of being a resident of the Fourth 
Procurement Zone.”181 But it insisted that “people do already identify 
themselves with certain broad sections or regions of the country such as the 
South, or the Middle West” and regional “divisions can be made so as to 
delineate areas of such uniqueness that such identifications and areal 
consciousness will be wellnigh impelling.”182 
The report’s identification of these individuals by their state citizenship 
(“no citizen of Iowa,” “no Californian,” “no Washingtonian”) was telling: in 
embracing Odum’s integrative regionalism, the NRC report also underscored 
the region’s persistent connection to the states. While many members of the 
regionalist movement had sought to shore up state power against the federal 
government, presenting “[g]overnment in the United States . . . as a conflict 
between the National Government and the States, an encroachment of one 
upon the other,”183 the NRC disavowed this framing. It favored federal 
 
178 See id. at 178 (expressing hope that regional arrangements would “utilize that general 
sectional loyalty and consciousness which now exists by turning it directly into planning activity” 
rather than allowing it to develop “into violent back-eddies and swirls of Federal distrust or 
jealousy”); see also id. at ix (noting that fixed regional boundaries might generate conflict while 
“interlocking regions” might have a “welding effect” and “promote the national solution of 
intersectional maladjustments”). 
179 Id. at 8. 
180 Id. at 153-54. 
181 Id. at 157. 
182 Id.; see also id. (suggesting that regions for planning should “conform to existing regional 
consciousness and sentiments”). 
183 Id. at vii. 
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responses to regional problems but insisted that these must be undertaken in 
coordination with the states and that the “National and State Governments 
should supplement, rather than supplant, each other.”184 Like other planning 
documents of the era, Regional Factors in National Planning and Development 
advocated state as well as federal action and sought to boost capacity at both 
levels of government.185 In addition to suggesting that state, regional, and 
national identity might be mutually enriching, the report called for federal 
aid to state planning boards, the encouragement of interstate compacts, and 
other federal support of interstate collaboration, as well as federal 
administrative cooperation with the states.186 
*      *      * 
Like much of the New Deal’s regionalism, the NRC’s proposals for full-
fledged regional planning never came to fruition. Congress killed the NRC 
altogether in the early 1940s; well before the Supreme Court handed down 
Schechter Poultry and Butler, the National Recovery Administration and the 
Agricultural Adjustment Administration had been largely disavowed; many 
other alphabet soup agencies did not long survive; and even the most 
successful of the regional experiments, the TVA, did not spawn other regional 
federal corporations despite repeated proposals.187 
If particular regional programs did not last, however, the New Deal’s 
regional model for extending federal government into new areas of domestic 
policy persisted. To this day, many federal agencies are organized along regional 
lines, including the major social welfare and environmental agencies established 
in the decades after the New Deal.188 Moreover, the regional offices of federal 
agencies continue to furnish regional accommodation and to implement federal 
law in different ways.189 Especially insofar as this reflects the relatively greater 
 
184 Id. 
185 Id. at 7. 
186 E.g., id. at x-xi; see JAMES T. PATTERSON, THE NEW DEAL AND THE STATES: 
FEDERALISM IN TRANSITION 119 (1969) (noting that, by 1937, every state had set up a planning 
board to receive federal funds, and that this was “a neat example of federalism, with Washington 
giving the money and states joyfully and inexpensively cooperating”). 
187 E.g., President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message to Congress on National Planning and 
Development of Natural Resources (June 3, 1937) (proposing seven regional river basin authorities); 
see also DERTHICK, supra note 5, at 42 (“Almost every year for nearly twenty years after passage of 
the TVA act, bills were introduced in Congress for authorities in other valleys.”). 
188 See supra Section I.B (noting the regional organization of federal agencies including the 
Department of Health and Human Services, the Department of Housing and Urban Development, 
and the Environmental Protection Agency). 
189 For example, the EPA’s regional offices differ substantially in the number and type of 
inspections they make, the enforcement citations they issue, the number and size of penalties they 
assess, and the manner in which they audit state compliance with laws including the Clean Air Act, 
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impact of state actors in the field as compared to in Washington, it is as much 
a legacy of the Great Society as of the New Deal. When federal programs 
burgeoned again in the 1960s, regional improvisation demonstrated the 
continuing utility of regions to projects of federal administration but also 
underscored limits of using regions to transcend federalism. 
 
the Clean Water Act, and the Surface Mining Reclamation Control Act. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. 
ACCOUNTING OFF., GAO-00-108, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: MORE CONSISTENCY 
NEEDED AMONG EPA REGIONS IN APPROACH TO ENFORCEMENT 23 (2000) (“[F]or fiscal year 
1998, regional and state inspection coverage for Clean Air Act–related programs ranged from a low of 
27 percent of facilities . . . in the Chicago region to a high of 74 percent for facilities in the Philadelphia 
region.”); SUSAN HUNTER & RICHARD W. WATERMAN, ENFORCING THE LAW 157-98 (1996) 
(explaining EPA regional offices enforce the National Pollution Discharge System differently); John 
Brehm & James T. Hamilton, Noncompliance in Environmental Reporting: Are Violators Ignorant, or 
Evasive, of the Law?, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 444, 449 n.5 (1996) (finding that accurate Toxics Release 
Inventory reporting to the EPA varied by region); Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously: 
Noncompliance and Creative Compliance in Environmental Law, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 297, 305 
(1999) (noting differences in enforcement of federal environmental statutes across states); Art Fraas 
et al., EPA’s New Source Review Program: Time for Reform?, 47 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,026, 10,030 (2017) 
(discussing regional variation in granting permission to operate electric generating units); Susan 
Hunter & Richard W. Waterman, Determining an Agency’s Regulatory Style: How Does the EPA Water 
Office Enforce the Law?, 45 W. POL. Q. 403, 415 (1992) (“There are considerable differences in the 
enforcement vigor of EPA’s 10 regional offices.”); David L. Markell, The Role of Deterrence-Based 
Enforcement in a “Reinvented” State/Federal Relationship: The Divide Between Theory and Reality, 24 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 54 (2000) (suggesting that the EPA has not worked to standardize 
expectations and demands within its regions); Clifford Rechtschaffen, Promoting Pragmatic Risk 
Regulation: Is Enforcement Discretion the Answer?, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1327, 1331 (2004) (describing 
regional differences in EPA enforcement of the Surface Mining Reclamation Control Act during 
the 1970s); William W. Sapp, Field Citation Programs: The “Ticket” to Better Environmental Compliance, 
20 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 12 (1995) (noting “considerable variation” in regional field citation 
programs). The Army Corps of Engineers also issues permits in a regionally differentiated manner. 
See Owen, supra note 8, at 97-99 (“[T]he Corps goes to great lengths to tailor . . . permits to state 
preferences and regional conditions.”). The Department of Homeland Security’s detainer program 
has been carried out differently across ICE’s field offices, and its Office of Citizenship and 
Immigration Services regions recognize asylum claims at different rates. See Jaya Ramji-Nogales et 
al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 374-75 (2007) (finding 
“dramatic differences” across regions); Targeting of ICE Detainers Varies Widely by State and by Facility, 
SYRACUSE U.: TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, (Feb. 11, 2014), 
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/343/ [https://perma.cc/55LC-ZER9] (finding disparities in 
the number of detainers issued against individuals who had not been convicted of any offense). OSHA 
regions impose different penalties on employers. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFF., 
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH: PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS ARE WELL BELOW 
MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE PENALTIES 26 tbl. III.6 (1992) (“Overall, 27 percent of all inspections with 
a violation had no penalty, but among regions this proportion ranged from 18 to 47 percent.”). And 
the regional offices of the Centers for Medicaid and Medicare vary in their approaches to 
investigations and enforcement actions with respect to emergency room treatment, nursing home 
care, and other matters. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE 
EMERGENCY MEDICAL TREATMENT AND LABOR ACT 13 (2001) (“The number of EMTALA 
investigations and their ultimate disposition vary widely by HCFA region . . . .”); Charlene 
Harrington et al., State Nursing Home Enforcement Systems, 29 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 43, 69 
(2004) (observing differences in enforcement patterns among Centers for Medicaid and Medicare 
regional offices). 
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III. FROM NATION TO STATE: MANAGING THE GREAT SOCIETY 
In the 1930s, regionalism facilitated the development of a substantial 
federal bureaucracy in a country skeptical of centralization and administrative 
governance. As the New Deal responded to the political precariousness of 
federal administration with regional accommodation and organization, 
however, it embraced territorial pluralism within national policy and created 
channels for state influence within federal programs. In enabling the federal 
government to expand its reach, regions also served as conduits for the 
periphery to influence the center and, more specifically, for state actors to 
shape federal administration. The regional idea further left open the 
possibility of new projects of multistate and joint state–federal governance. 
During the next regional moment of the twentieth century, the possibilities 
of state influence within national regionalism emerged more clearly. As in the 
1920s and 1930s, regionalism “gained renewed prominence”190 in the 1960s as 
states worked together to respond to new challenges and promote shared 
interests, and the federal government turned to regional organization to 
manage federal programs. While the regionalism of the 1960s continued to ease 
the development of a still-burgeoning federal bureaucracy, however, its role in 
bolstering state resources and capacity became more pronounced. State and 
federal actors created hybrid regional forms, such as the joint state–federal 
compact, and the federal government sought to orient its own regional 
apparatus more deliberately around the states. The federal regionalism that had 
partially supplanted interstate collaboration during the New Deal yielded in 
turn to joint state–federal undertakings. 
Great Society regionalism was marked by a new appreciation of state–federal 
integration. Much as they had in the 1920s and 1930s, a variety of state actors 
advocated regional organization as a means of preserving state power, but now 
their regional projects sought federal participation; instead of describing the 
region as a place to forestall federal administration, states treated it as a place to 
harness federal assistance, particularly grants-in-aid. Consistent with this view of 
jointness as potentially state-empowering, the constitutional concerns about 
regional state–federal administration flipped from their New Deal versions: 
detractors no longer questioned whether the federal government was exceeding 
its powers, but instead asked whether state–federal hybridity gave too much 
control to the states at the expense of the federal government. 
 
190 U.S. ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, MULTISTATE 
REGIONALISM 7 (1978) [hereinafter ACIR, MULTISTATE REGIONALISM]. 
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A. Hybrid Administration 
Looking back over the 1960s, the Advisory Commission on 
Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) argued that it had been “an era of 
experimentation with new institutional forms to meet broad development 
problems transcending State and substate jurisdictional boundaries.”191 
Although this period is probably better recognized for the most significant 
expansion of federal administration since the New Deal, ACIR called 
attention to the “unprecedented reliance on Federal–multistate regional 
instrumentalities.”192 In response to “administrative, political and fiscal 
difficulties” concerning economic development and natural resources, in 
particular, government officials and commentators regarded distinct state and 
federal solutions as inadequate, and “the Federal–multistate partnership 
concept emerged as a popular formula.”193 
This partnership appeared most prominently in the DRBC, which was 
created in 1961 to settle disputes over the allocation of the river’s water and 
to develop the river’s resources,194 and the Appalachian Regional Commission 
(ARC), which was created in 1965 to foster economic development in a 
depressed region.195 Each commission joined a single federal representative 
with the governors of each affected state to form a hybrid state–federal 
body.196 
 
191 Id. at 209. 
192 Id. 
193 Id. at 169; see id. (“Common to all of these recent regional efforts was the view that the 
traditional interstate compact approach involving only the participating States was inappropriate or 
inadequate for certain program purposes, and that the Federal–single State relationship did not 
cover sufficiently the interstate ramifications of these functional concerns.”). 
194 Delaware River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 87-328, 75 Stat. 688, 688 (1961). 
195 Appalachian Regional Development Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-4, § 2, 79 Stat. 5, 6. 
196 The DRBC includes the governors of Delaware, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania. 
§ 14.22, 75 Stat. at 713. The ARC includes the governors of Alabama, Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland, 
Mississippi, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, 
and West Virginia. § 403, 79 Stat. at 22. 
Regional commissions for river basin planning and economic development were also adopted on 
a nationwide basis in 1965. The Public Works and Economic Development Act of 1965 created Title 
V Commissions, loosely based on the Appalachian Regional Commission, to enable “the Federal 
government, in cooperation with the States, [to] help areas characterized by substantial and persistent 
unemployment and underemployment and relatively low income levels to take effective steps in 
planning and financing their public works projects and economic development.” ACIR, MULTISTATE 
REGIONALISM, supra note 190, at 59; Public Works and Economic Development Act of 1965, Pub. L. 
No. 89-136, § 101, 79 Stat. 552, 552-53. The same year, Congress also created Title II River Basin 
Commissions operating on a regional basis through state–federal cooperation. Water Resources 
Planning Act of 1965, Pub. L. 89-80, 79 Stat. 244, 246-47. See generally ACIR, MULTISTATE 
REGIONALISM, supra note 190, at 53-136 (discussing Title V and Title II Commissions); DERTHICK, 
supra note 5, at 108-56 (same). Neither the Title V nor Title II Commissions garnered the support or 
funding of the DRBC or ARC, and President Reagan ultimately disbanded both. 
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The impetus for both the DRBC and the ARC came from governors, 
whose proposals can fruitfully be seen as post–New Deal variants of 
Frankfurter and Landis’s argument for interstate adjustments.197 Regionalists 
of the 1920s and 1930s had called for state collaboration to preserve state power, 
insisting that if the states did not work together, they would inevitably cede 
their governance prerogatives to the federal government.198 By the 1960s, it 
was indisputable that the federal government had assumed these prerogatives. 
Now, the region promised continued vitality for the states insofar as they 
joined not only with one another but also with the federal government.199 If 
state–federal cooperation had a decidedly federal-power-enhancing flavor in 
the 1930s, by the 1960s it could be turned toward state survival. Updating the 
“states must put up or shut up” logic of W. Brook Graves,200 Frank Grad 
argued in 1963: 
An emphasis on “states’ rights” and a narrow emphasis on “local home rule” 
misses the mark entirely. An approach to problems of regional dimensions 
can only be in terms of larger units—and this leaves only two major 
alternatives: federal action, or interstate action with federal participation 
when necessary. The choice is largely up to the states.201 
 
In their place, more discrete regional commissions modeled on the DRC and ARC have emerged. 
Federal–state compacts have been adopted for the Susquehanna and Alabama-Coosa-Tallapoosa river 
basins, see ZIMMERMAN, supra note 21, at 249, and economic development commissions have been 
charted for the Lower Mississippi Delta and the Northern Great Plains, see EUGENE BOYD, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., RL33076, FEDERAL REGIONAL AUTHORITIES AND COMMISSIONS: THEIR 
FUNCTION AND DESIGN 15-17, 25-26 (2006). More recently, the Food Conservation and Energy Act of 
2008, Pub. L. No. 110–234, 122 Stat. 923, 1481, created a new group of regional development bodies. See 40 
U.S.C. §§ 15731– 5733 (2012) (establishing the membership of the Northern Border Regional Commission, 
the Southeast Crescent Regional Commission, and the Southwest Border Regional Commission). 
197 See supra notes 114–119 and accompanying text. 
198 See supra Section II.A. 
199 See, e.g., Edmund G. Brown, How to Put the States Back in Business, HARPER’S MAG., Sept. 
1964, at 99, 99-100 (arguing, as Governor of California, that the state’s interest “requires preservation 
of the power and mechanics of federal cooperative activity” and calling for “federal legislation 
creating formal regional structures within which states may take joint action”). 
200 Supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
201 Frank P. Grad, Federal-State Compact: A New Experiment in Cooperative Federalism, 63 
COLUM. L. REV. 825, 851 (1963); see also id. at 851-52 (noting that Frankfurter and Landis wrongly 
anticipated a vast array of regional interstate compact machinery for electric power but had been 
correct to regard compacts as the most flexible device for addressing regional problems). If Grad 
echoed Frankfurter and Landis’s belief that interstate adjustments could preserve a role for states, 
he also gestured to a state-centric view of Odum and Moore’s nationalist regionalism: 
Whether such a system of federal-state compacts will succeed in the effective 
resolution of broad, region-wide problems, while bridging the gap in effective state 
participation in the formulation of policy, will depend on the states’ maturity to 
assume this new role. The states will fail in this effort if they regard compacts like the 
Delaware River Basin Compact as an affirmation of a narrow concept of state 
418 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 166: 377 
Governors in the Delaware River Basin and Appalachia recognized 
“interstate action with federal participation” as a way to preserve state authority 
while channeling federal resources to their areas. The DRBC founders’ 
concerns were principally administrative. They had been frustrated by the need 
both to resort to litigation over water rights among the states and to work with 
a number of different federal agencies with jurisdiction over the area.202 
Wanting to ensure a state role in any regional development body—in contrast 
to the purely federal TVA—but also to have federal representation so that the 
body would have complete control over water resources development in the 
area—in contrast to a traditional interstate compact, like the Colorado River 
Compact—these officials proposed a novel joint state–federal compact.203 
The ARC was likewise initiated by governors who appreciated that a 
continuing role for state government depended on integration with the 
federal government. For these Appalachian governors, such integration 
meant, specifically, increasing federal aid to their depressed region.204 
Regional development, the governors argued, was impossible without federal 
aid, but states wanted to distribute the federal funds.205 
The constitutional discourse around regionalism shifted during this 
period in a manner consistent with governors’ advocacy for state–federal 
 
sovereignty. They may succeed if, along with the assertion of legitimate interests of 
their own, they regard their role as historic, independently functioning parts of a 
regional polity and of a national union. 
Id. at 854-55. 
202 See ACIR, MULTISTATE REGIONALISM, supra note 190, at 101 (noting litigation among 
New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania over water rights); DERTHICK, supra note 5, at 47-53. 
203 Federal officials had participated in interstate agreements previously, as Justice Frankfurter 
noted in West Virginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims. See 341 U.S. 22, 27-28 (1951) (“Not only was congressional 
consent required, as for all compacts; direct participation by the Federal Government was provided 
in the President’s appointment of three members of the Compact Commission.”). But the DRBC 
was the first joint state–federal compact and was widely understood to mark something new. In the 
words of two contemporary commentators, “For the first time anywhere in the United States, a 
major interstate basin is to be served by a governmental agency which is at once a part of the 
government of each of the affected states and the United States Government.” DERTHICK, supra 
note 5, at 47 (quoting Frederick L. Zimmerman & Mitchell Wendell, New Horizons on the Delaware, 
36 ST. GOV’T 157, 157 (1963)). These commentators celebrated the unified program that would 
replace “the competition, overlapping, duplication and jurisdictional no man’s lands which have 
characterized the separate efforts of a multitude of local, state and federal agencies.” Id. 
204 See DERTHICK, supra note 5, at 76 (noting that while the founders of the DRBC “set out 
to create an organization,” the founders of the ARC “set out to create a program of federal spending 
for a depressed region,” although their organization ultimately came “to be valued for its own sake”). 
205 See ACIR, MULTISTATE REGIONALISM, supra note 190, at 17-24. See generally Andrew 
Isserman & Terance Rephann, The Economic Effects of the Appalachian Regional Commission: An 
Empirical Assessment of 26 Years of Regional Development Planning, 61 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 345 (1995) 
(measuring the effects of ARC programs on 391 counties and suggesting that these programs 
facilitated regional economic development, with Appalachia growing significantly faster than its 
control group in income, earnings, population, and per capita income). 
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hybridity. When the National Resources Committee advocated joint state–
federal compacts in 1935,206 there was considerable uncertainty about whether 
the Commerce Clause would support a federal role in such agreements. 
Indeed, the NRC advocated interstate compacts (without federal 
participation) to work around limitations on federal power in areas of national 
and regional concern: “The interstate compact may be a useful instrument 
when the Federal Government finds itself with insufficient authority to deal 
with a regional or national problem . . . . [When] the commerce clause is held 
not to cover the situation, the interstate compact may be the way out.”207 In 
the intervening years, however, dual federalism had been firmly interred, the 
commerce power appeared more or less plenary, and a constitutional 
federalism objection was no longer salient.208 
Instead, in the 1960s, concerns about the constitutionality of hybrid bodies 
came from federal executive agencies worried about the diminishment of 
federal authority. For instance, the Department of the Interior argued that 
the proposed DRBC was unconstitutional because it would require the 
federal government to yield some of its powers to “a third form of 
government” and would operate river basins “under sort of an Articles of 
Confederacy.”209 Although the Department of Justice concluded that the 
arrangement was likely constitutional, it suggested that the President and 
Congress should cautiously evaluate “the scheme contemplated by the 
Compact in the light of the political scheme envisioned by the Constitution 
itself.”210 And the Bureau of the Budget objected that the proposed ARC 
 
206 See NRC REPORT, supra note 16, at x (“It is suggested, for serious consideration, that in 
some classes of compacts requiring continuous administration there should be Federal 
participation.”); see also JANE PERRY CLARK, THE RISE OF A NEW FEDERALISM: FEDERAL-STATE 
COOPERATION IN THE UNITED STATES 72 (1938) (“If the interest of the federal government is 
important enough, it may even enter a compact itself as a full-fledged participant.”). 
207 NRC REPORT, supra note 16, at 50. 
208 See, e.g., Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1 (1950). 
209 DERTHICK, supra note 5, at 51 (quoting Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall). 
210 As the Office of Legal Counsel observed: 
[T]he Compact does not clearly violate any specific provisions of the Federal 
Constitution. The Constitution is silent with regard to federal adherence to an 
interstate compact; it neither endorses nor proscribes a hybrid commission as a 
mechanism for achieving joint federal-state objectives . . . . In short, if Congress and 
the President find this compact an appropriate means for promoting and protecting 
the national interest, we believe it unlikely that the federal government would find 
itself barred by a judicial finding of unconstitutionality. But, the President and the 
Congress have constitutional responsibilities also, and it is incumbent upon them to 
consider the scheme contemplated by the Compact in the light of the political scheme 
envisioned by the Constitution itself. 
Memorandum from Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to the 
Honorable Frederick G. Dutton (Apr. 25, 1961), quoted in DERTHICK, supra note 5, at 51 n.10. 
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would be unconstitutional insofar as it allowed governors, not subject to 
presidential direction and control, to “participate in the direction and control 
of a Federal agency.”211 Although many of these constitutional objections were 
met with administrative fixes, the authority of the state commissioners 
expanded over time. The ARC, especially, grew more state-focused as initial 
compromises designed to assuage federal executive officials wilted in practice 
and were ultimately removed in legislative reauthorizations.212 
That the objections to the DRBC and ARC proposals came from federal 
executive officials, in particular, suggested a final feature of the era’s 
regionalism: regions were perceived as tools for allocating authority not only 
between state and federal governments, but also within the states or, 
especially, the federal government. When governors proposed the DRBC, for 
instance, they recognized joint state–federal action as a means of disciplining 
the federal executive branch as well as ensuring a continuing role for the 
states. State officials had been frustrated by the multiplicity of federal agency 
jurisdiction, and the attendant multiplicity of federal agency views, when it 
came to managing the river basin. Believing that “the Federal Government 
 
Subsequent Department of Justice opinions showed greater comfort with federal–state 
compacts. See, e.g., Applicability of Compact Clause to Use of Multiple State Entities Under the 
Water Resources Planning Act, 4B Op. O.L.C. 828, 830 (1980) (concluding that agreements between 
the federal government and the states do not require congressional consent under the Compact 
Clause). The hybrid form nonetheless continues to raise constitutional and administrative law 
questions. See, e.g., New York v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 896 F. Supp. 2d 180, 197-98 (E.D.N.Y. 
2012) (noting “multiple difficult issues, including . . . whether the DRBC is a federal agency . . . [or] 
the presence of a federal officer on the DRBC, and the support and assistance federal agencies give 
to the DRBC, are sufficient to ‘federalize’ the DRBC’s actions”); O’Connell, supra note 76, at 896 
(discussing New York v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers). 
211 Jill M. Fraley, Stealth Constitutional Change and the Geography of Law, 4 DREXEL L. REV. 
467, 477 (2012) (quoting Harold Seidman, Assistant Director for Management and Organization); 
see also id. (quoting Seidman’s objection that “a limited number of State governors would be accorded 
authority with respect to Federal programs for which they could not be held responsible or 
accountable”). But cf. Officers of the United States Within the Meaning of the Appointments 
Clause, Op. O.L.C., 2007 WL 1405459, at *20 (“[S]tate officers ordinarily do not possess delegated 
sovereign authority of the federal Government, even when they assist in the administration of 
federal law. Thus, the Appointments Clause ordinarily does not apply to them.”). 
212 Most notably, the ARC was not initially authorized to make expenditures; it was an 
advisory and planning body that would propose spending projects to federal agencies. In the 1967 
amendments, however, the ARC was made a grant-in-aid administrator and was authorized to make 
expenditures, although as a lingering constitutional safeguard, funds were appropriated to the 
President (who would provide them to the federal cochairman) rather than directly to the 
Commission. Appalachian Regional Development Act Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-103, 
§ 214, 81 Stat. 257, 263. In 1998, this presidential role was removed and funds were authorized to be 
appropriated directly to the ARC. Economic Development Administration and Appalachian 
Regional Development Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-393, § 217, 112 Stat. 3596, 3622. 
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can be controlled only by itself,” they insisted on federal participation in the 
compact to “coordinate and integrate the programs of the Federal agencies.”213 
This gubernatorial proposal of regional interagency coordination had 
roots in the work of the National Resource Committee, which had argued 
that there was “a special responsibility on the Federal Government to set its 
own house in order by insuring the careful coordination of its own agencies 
. . . in any area, so that the Federal powers can more effectively mesh in with 
those of the other governments in the area.”214 And interagency coordination 
would become a prominent theme of the federal government’s more 
instrumental turn to regionalism in the ensuing years, particularly during the 
Nixon Administration.215 But here, in the proposal for a joint state–federal 
compact, it was the states that expressed concern about a lack of federal 
agency coordination. And their proposal for getting the federal government’s 
“house in order” was to have a single federal representative who might speak 
for Washington, rather than joining together various agency officials in the 
field. Although federal multiplicity persisted, the states counted it a victory 
when nineteen federal agencies relinquished authority over the river basin 
upon the creation of the DRBC.216 
If the DRBC suggested that regional organization might coordinate federal 
agency action through consolidation, the ARC suggested it might also 
redistribute authority within the states. As Martha Derthick noted in 1974, 
“The commission has emphasized the importance of enhancing the governor’s 
power, consistent with theories of governmental reform that have prevailed in 
Washington in the 1960s and early 1970s . . . . Elected chief executives are 
widely believed to need strengthening in relation to functional specialists 
. . . .”217 Governors themselves were not necessarily as interested in the 
 
213 DERTHICK, supra note 5, at 65 (quoting Delaware River Basin Compact, H.R. 310, 87th 
Cong. 7 (1st Sess. 1961)). As New Jersey Governor Robert B. Meyner put it: 
If you leave us as four states in a Compact, you are leaving us chasing around from 
[federal] agency to [federal] agency to get the job done. We think . . . that if you adopt 
this Compact, there will be one person appointed by the President who can coordinate 
these agencies, and at least get them to take a position. 
Id. 
214 NRC REPORT, supra note 16, at vii. 
215 See infra notes 226-238 and accompanying text. 
216 O’Connell, supra note 76, at 872; see About DRBC, DELAWARE RIVER BASIN COMM’N, 
http://nj.gov/drbc/about/ (last visited Oct. 13, 2017) (noting that the DRBC was intended to replace 
“some 43 state agencies, 14 interstate agencies, and 19 federal agencies [that] exercised a multiplicity 
of splintered powers and duties within the watershed”). 
217 DERTHICK, supra note 5, at 102; see also ACIR, MULTISTATE REGIONALISM, supra note 
190, at 49 (noting the limited role of state legislatures). 
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commission form as such proponents hoped,218 but the ARC’s vision of state–
federal executive collaboration in the region anticipated further developments. 
B. In Search of Intergovernmental and Interagency Coordination 
When President Lyndon Johnson signed the ARC into law, as the first 
Great Society program enacted by the 89th Congress, he celebrated it as “the 
truest example of creative federalism in our times.”219 Although Johnson was 
likely more skeptical of the ARC than this endorsement let on,220 his 
association of the region with successful intergovernmental relations was 
suggestive. The ARC showcased regional organization as a means of 
negotiating increasingly complex relations between the federal government 
and the states, an issue that preoccupied both the Johnson and Nixon 
Administrations. 
State–federal relations had become particularly complicated given the 
dramatic increase in grants-in-aid in the 1960s. As the Great Society extended 
the federal presence in areas including education, welfare, health, and the 
environment, federal programs tended to confer funds on states to achieve 
 
218 See DERTHICK, supra note 5, at 102 (“The commission’s own evaluation found . . . the 
Governors have not fully capitalized on the general management potential of the program.”). But 
see U.S. ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, IMPROVING FEDERAL 
GRANTS MANAGEMENT A-53 44 (1977) [hereinafter ACIR, FEDERAL GRANTS] (“A number of 
governors were quoted as particularly valuing the gubernatorial control over Appalachian funds.”). 
219 President Lyndon B. Johnson, Remarks upon Signing the Appalachia Bill, 1 PUB. PAPERS 
271 (Mar. 9, 1965) (“Originated by the Governors of the Appalachian States, formed in close 
cooperation with the Federal Executive, approved and enacted by the Congress of all the people, 
this is the truest example of creative federalism in our times.”). 
220 See Fraley, supra note 211, at 477-80. The ARC concept first found support from President 
Kennedy following his primary victory in West Virginia. After Kennedy’s assassination, President 
Johnson was persuaded that “here was a good way for him to get into the South, a way to find 
common ground with Southern governors and do something for the South, completely outside the 
racial issue.” DAVID M. WELBORN & JESSE BURKHEAD, INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS IN 
THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE STATE: THE JOHNSON PRESIDENCY 138 (1989) (quoting 
William L. Batt, Jr., head of the Area Redevelopment Administration). Johnson also worried that 
Pennsylvania’s Governor William Scranton, a potential Republican presidential candidate, might 
use the administration’s failure to act to his advantage. See id. at 138-40. 
The political forces pushing for a regional commission in Appalachia have ensured the ARC’s 
survival. When President Reagan attempted to eliminate the ARC, arguing that it served “no 
national economic purpose but instead cater[ed], at taxpayer’s expense, to local and regional political 
interests,” those same political interests—represented in part by conservative Republican senators 
from the region—thwarted his plan. Ben A. Franklin, Despite 20 Years of Federal Aid, Poverty Still 
Reigns in Appalachia, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 11, 1985), http://www.nytimes.com/1985/08/11/us/despite-20-
years-of-federal-aid-poverty-still-reigns-in-appalachia.html?pagewanted=all (last visited Oct. 18, 
2017). President Donald Trump’s proposal to kill the ARC will likely continue to meet a similar fate. 
See, e.g., Alana Abramson, President Trump’s Budget Proposes Eliminating This Commission. 95% of 
Counties It Helps Voted for Him, TIME (May 24, 2017), http://time.com/4793315/donald-trump-
budget-appalachian-regional-commission/ [https://perma.cc/WV9J-KS8Z] (discussing Trump’s 
budget proposal to eliminate the ARC). 
2018] Our Regionalism 423 
their objectives. Grants-in-aid increased roughly threefold in both number 
and amount during this decade.221 The programs were also administratively 
complex: “Creative federalism . . . required several federal agencies to 
cooperate among themselves and jointly with state and local governments on 
a single project.” Moreover, “considerable overlapping and duplication existed 
within functional areas: HUD, USDA, and EDA provided grants and loans 
for water and sewer work; HEW, Labor, HUD, Agriculture, Commerce, and 
OEO all made education and training grants . . . .”222 The heavy reliance on 
grants-in-aid therefore gave rise to new coordination difficulties not only 
between the federal government and state and local governments, but also 
within the federal government itself. 
Regions appeared to offer new hope for interagency and intergovernmental 
coordination alike. Just as states had proposed hybrid commissions, recognizing 
that successful state governance depended on federal assistance, the federal 
government likewise recognized that the success of its programs hinged on 
collaboration with, and capacity-building within, the states.223 Moreover, ties 
between the federal government and individual states often appeared inadequate. 
Like his New Deal predecessors, President Johnson was struck by the 
“irrationalities of present State and local jurisdictional boundaries” when it came 
to “problems of unusual magnitude: mass education, hard core poverty . . . , air 
and water pollution, transportation.”224 Because such jurisdictional 
irrationality was also manifest within federal administration, the Johnson 
Administration’s advocacy for a “creative federalism” that would more flexibly 
 
221 See TIMOTHY CONLAN, FROM NEW FEDERALISM TO DEVOLUTION: TWENTY-FIVE 
YEARS OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL REFORM 6 (1998) (noting that the number of federal grant 
programs increased from 132 to 379 and federal aid dollars increased from $7 billion to $24 billion); 
Deil S. Wright, Intergovernmental Relations: An Analytical Overview, 416 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & 
SOC. SCI. 1, 10 (1974) (“Federal grants jumped in dollar magnitude from $4.9 billion in 1958 to $23.9 
billion in 1970.”). Some of these funds bypassed the states and went directly to local governments. 
222 LARRY BERMAN, THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET AND THE 
PRESIDENCY, 1921–1979, at 80-81 (1979); see also DERTHICK, supra note 5, at 158-59 (quoting Bureau 
of Budget Deputy Director Phillip S. Hughes as informing Congress that the federal government 
was playing “a role in many communities and most States which did not exist 10 or even 5 years ago: 
it acts as a catalyst for joint attacks on common problems” and it “becomes an active partner in these 
cooperative programs, through the common effort of several Federal agencies on a specific project 
within an individual community”). 
223 See, e.g., Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-577, 82 Stat. 1098 
(1968) (offering assistance to states to “achieve the fullest cooperation and coordination of activities 
among the levels of government”); WELBORN & BURKHEAD, supra note 220, at 199-207 (discussing 
the federal government’s emphasis on strengthening state and local government); cf. Beer, supra note 
18, at 18 (suggesting that “the programs of the professional bureaucratic complex . . . created the 
intergovernmental lobby” as state politicians became aware of the programs’ value). 
224 Fraley, supra note 211, at 469 (quoting President Johnson and Budget Director Charles Schultze). 
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respond to cross-jurisdictional problems225 envisioned, among other things, a 
change to the federal bureaucracy: the harmonization of federal regions. 
Federal regional harmonization was not a new proposal. Recognizing that 
more than 100 different regional schemes for federal agencies had come into 
use by 1935, the National Resources Committee had suggested unifying the 
federal government’s regional approach, and the Brownlow Committee that 
led to the creation of the Executive Office of the Presidency likewise 
endorsed such regional streamlining.226 As this lineage suggests, and as I 
explore elsewhere, the project of regional alignment was central to arguments 
for presidential control over the bureaucracy.227 Yet this project had fallen to 
the side as other aspects of the executive reorganization were adopted.228 
When the Johnson Administration revived the proposal, it had devolutionary 
import even as it retained its utility with respect to presidential control.229 
Instead of treating the federal region as a place to transcend the states, the 
proposed regional realignment sought to tailor federal regions more 
consistently to state borders. If a creative federalism was necessary to 
achieving the national ends of the Great Society, the proposal implied, federal 
administration would have to bend more toward the states.230 
Although federal regions were not reconfigured under Johnson, President 
Nixon instructed in 1969 that the agencies responsible for most of the nation’s 
grants-in-aid should adopt common regional boundaries and regional office 
 
225 See President Lyndon B. Johnson, Remarks at the University of Michigan, 1 PUB. PAPERS 
704, 706 (May 23, 1964) (arguing that the solution to problems such as poverty “does not rest on a 
massive program in Washington, nor can it rely solely on the strained resources of local authority” 
but instead requires “new concepts of cooperation, a creative federalism, between the National 
Capital and the leaders of local communities”). 
226 See NRC REPORT, supra note 16, at vii, 29; PRESIDENT’S COMM. ON ADMIN. MGMT., 
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE WITH STUDIES OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT IN THE 
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 30 (1937). 
227 See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Area and Presidential Administration (unpublished manuscript) 
(on file with author). 
228 See Reorganization Act of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-19, §§ 1-12, 53 Stat. 561, 561-64 (1939) 
(creating the Executive Office of the President), superseded by Act of Sept. 6, 1966, Pub. L. No. 554, 
§§ 901–906, 80 Stat. 378, 394-96 (1966). 
229 See, e.g., A Final Report by the President’s Task Force on Government Organization, The 
Organization and Management of Great Society Programs 5 (June 15, 1967) (Indiana University 
Libraries) (on file with author) (proposing standardized regions, with regional offices run by “strong 
regional line executives” responsible for “the full range of functions commanded by the 
corresponding Presidential deputy in Washington” and suggesting that “[l]ines of operating 
authority and responsibility should run directly between the Presidential deputy in Washington and 
his general regional executive subordinates, and not between the functional representatives of 
specialized bureaus, as is now so frequently the pattern”). 
230 See generally WELBORN & BURKHEAD, supra note 220, at 237-38 (considering “why the 
Johnson presidency did not administer more Great Society programs as national programs, without 
attempting to involve the states and local government”). 
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locations.231 Justifying this reorganization as a matter of “rationalization, 
coordination, and decentralization,” the presidential statement suggested that 
regional standardization would facilitate the devolution of power from the 
federal government to the states.232 In addition, Nixon created Federal 
Regional Councils, comprising agency representatives, to coordinate federal 
efforts in the field.233 He argued that these councils would “make it possible for 
the Federal Government to speak consistently and with a single voice in its 
dealings with States and localities, with private organizations, and with the 
public.”234 This single voice would not come from a lone federal representative, 
as in the hybrid ARC and DRBC bodies, but would emerge from the 
integration of multiple agencies in the field. The structure of the Federal 
Regional Councils, in particular, suggested a different agenda not lost on 
contemporary commentators: Nixon’s attempt to amplify the power of the 
White House vis-à-vis the bureaucracy. Much of the regional “coordination” 
that was sought was “the insertion of the presidency” into agency operations.235 
 
231 Nixon, Common Regional Boundaries, supra note 46, at 256 (creating common boundaries for 
“the Department of Labor; the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare; the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development; the Office of Economic Opportunity; and the Small Business 
Administration”). Nixon originally described eight regions, but he added two more a few months later. 
Richard M. Nixon, Statement on the Realignment of Regional Boundaries of Certain Federal Agencies 
(May 21, 1969). The Office of Management and Budget, which was charged with implementing the 
directive, codified the ten regions in a circular in 1974. OMB, CIRCULAR NO. A-105, supra note 46. 
Although OMB rescinded the Circular in 1995, OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE 
OF THE PRESIDENT, RESCISSION OF OMB CIRCULARS, 60 Fed. Reg. 15,171 (Mar. 22, 1995), a 
number of agencies continue to use the standard regions, see supra Section I.B. 
232 Nixon, Common Regional Boundaries, supra note 46, at 256; cf. ACIR, MULTISTATE 
REGIONALISM, supra note 190, at 3-4 (noting that “the proliferated pattern of field administration 
under the Roosevelt Administration bespoke a different philosophy of Federal power than the ten 
uniform Federal regions being utilized by the Nixon Administration” insofar as the former approach 
“tends to compartmentalize Federal agencies, fracture consistent Federal field administration and 
discourage uniform State-local inputs into Federal programs while the latter tends to do the opposite”). 
233 Exec. Order No. 11,647, 37 Fed. Reg. 3167 (Feb. 10, 1972). The 1972 executive order formally 
established Federal Regional Councils for each of the ten standard regions; the councils included 
the regional directors of relevant domestic agencies, which controlled roughly 90% of grants-in-aid, 
with representatives from OMB authorized to participate in any deliberations, and a chairman 
chosen by the President. See William H. Kolberg, The New Federalism: Regional Councils and Program 
Coordination Efforts, in ASPA, NEW FEDERALISM, supra note 73, at 52. Subsequent executive orders 
expanded both the membership and mandate of the Federal Regional Councils. Exec. Order No. 
12,149, 44 Fed. Reg. 43247 (July 20, 1979); Exec. Order No. 11,892, 41 Fed. Reg. 751 (Dec. 31, 1975); 
Exec. Order No. 11,731, 38 Fed. Reg. 19903 (July 23, 1973). 
234 Nixon, Common Regional Boundaries, supra note 46, at 257; see also Exec. Order No. 11,647, 
supra note 233 (“The proper functioning of Government requires the development of closer working 
relationships between major Federal grant-making agencies and State and local government and 
improved coordination of the categorical grant system.”). 
235 Kolberg, supra note 233, at 54; see, e.g., Harry N. Scheiber, Redesigning the Architecture of 
Federalism—An American Tradition: Modern Devolution Policies in Perspective, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 227, 
289 (1996) (“[T]he so-called Nixon reforms . . . consisted of a set of strong executive initiatives to effect 
concentration and centralization of power in the hands of the President and his immediate circle.”). 
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Even in this, however, the proposal depended rather heavily on federalism 
and devolution. Recognizing that the President needed allies, the regional 
realignment sought to form a “vertical alliance of generalists from Washington 
down through the federal regional offices to statehouses and city halls.”236 By 
empowering state executives, the Administration might achieve ends 
frustrated by Congress and agency specialists. That Nixon’s regional plan cast 
the states as instrumental to presidential ambition underscored the enduring, 
though evolving, relationship between regionalism and federalism across the 
twentieth century. While the Federal Regional Councils failed in relatively 
short order and were disbanded,237 the state-focused approach to federal 
regions persisted, and states have continued to exercise greater influence on 
federal agencies’ regional offices than on D.C. headquarters.238 
If interstate collaboration had largely yielded to federal action in the New 
Deal era, Great Society projects revealed just how much the federal turn to 
regionalism relied upon the states. As new pressures were placed on 
administration in the 1960s, the region was used to integrate the states more fully 
into federal programs. The dominant prior approaches to regional governance—
interstate coordination and federal administrative divisions—were also partially 
 
236 DERTHICK, supra note 5, at 180; see Kolberg, supra note 233, at 52 (arguing the Federal 
Regional Council system was established to “better coordinate and relate the objectives of these 
[federal] programs to the general ends of governors, mayors, and executives of the other units of 
general purpose local government”); Richard M. Nixon, Letter About the Formation of Federal 
Regional Councils, Jan. 22, 1971, PUB. PAPERS 49, 50 (1971) (“[O]ne of my priority aims is to 
establish a more effective partnership between the States and the Federal Government.”); cf. supra 
notes 217–218 and accompanying text (noting the governor-empowering aspiration of the ARC). 
237 President Reagan disbanded the FRCs in 1983 after restructuring them. Exec. Order No. 
12,314, 46 Fed. Reg. 38,329 (Jul. 22, 1981) (reorganizing the FRCs); Exec. Order No. 12,407, 48 Fed. 
Reg. 7717 (1983) (eliminating “a mechanism for interagency and intergovernmental coordination 
which is no longer needed”). 
238 See, e.g., HUNTER & WATERMAN, supra note 189, at 161 (suggesting that state governments 
exert an independent impact on NPDES enforcement); DENISE SCHEBERLE, FEDERALISM AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 193-98 (rev. ed. 2004) (exploring the relationship between state and 
regional officials in the implementation of six environmental programs); David M. Hedge, A Spatial 
Model of Regulation, 21 AM. POL. Q. 387, 405 (1993) (“[S]tate actors are able to significantly influence 
the actions of federal authorities and, in doing so, limit federal control.”); David M. Hedge & Saba 
Jallow, The Federal Context of Regulation: The Spatial Allocation of Federal Enforcement, 71 SOC. SCI. Q. 
786, 789 (1990) (“Within a federal system, federal regulation will vary geographically as regulatory 
officials fashion enforcement strategies that respond to each state’s political and economic milieu as 
well as regional differences in the federal agency’s internal dynamics.”); Owen, supra note 8, at 97-99 
(documenting how state preferences inform Clean Water Act permitting decisions); John T. Scholz & 
Cheng-Lung Wang, Cooptation or Transformation? Local Policy Networks and Federal Regulatory 
Enforcement, 50 AM. J. POL. SCI. 81, 93 (2006) (concluding that local institutions “transform” the 
enforcement of NPDES water permits); John T. Scholz & Feng Heng Wei, Regulatory Enforcement in a 
Federalist System, 80 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1249, 1262 (1986) (finding OHSA enforcement procedures 
respond significantly to state-level political differences); John T. Scholz et al., Street-Level Political 
Controls Over Federal Bureaucracy, 85 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 829, 830 (1991) (investigating the influence 
of state elected officials on federal bureaucracies). 
2018] Our Regionalism 427 
supplanted by hybrid state–federal undertakings, which have assumed renewed 
importance, and new shape, in the early years of the twenty-first century. 
IV. TOWARD A NEW POLITICS OF AREA 
The legacy of New Deal and Great Society regionalism remains strong today. 
Federal administration is largely regional in structure, and particular innovations 
of each period, including the TVA and the ARC, live on.239 New regional 
approaches have also emerged. In response to some of the concerns that have 
long motivated regional argument—fragmentation, jurisdictional mismatch, and 
the attendant quest for greater intergovernmental and interagency 
coordination—contemporary regional solutions largely eschew formal 
organization and instead posit the region as a site of nonhierarchical, flexible 
collaboration among state, federal, and other actors. In brief, today’s regionalism 
has been assimilated to the day’s reigning governance concept: the network. 
Although the network metaphor has been exhausted, it anticipates a 
development we might term “regionalism without regions”: collaborations 
among state and federal actors that need not involve contiguous areas. Just as 
regional improvisation has responded to governance challenges of past 
decades, nascent developments suggest a new variant responsive to today’s 
polarized partisanship. Regionalism without regions represents both the 
revival and transformation of the political sectionalism that has always 
informed American regionalism but that slipped behind an administrative 
veneer for much of the twentieth century. 
A. A Space for the Network 
In the early years of the twenty-first century, the network metaphor pervades 
writing about government and governance.240 Instead of hierarchical, formal 
 
239 See supra Part I (cataloging contemporary regional forms); supra notes 189, 238 (noting 
variation among, and state influence on, regional divisions of federal agencies). 
240 For examples of the governance network metaphor in the public administration literature, see 
ROBERT AGRANOFF, MANAGING WITHIN NETWORKS 23-34 (2007); Hugh Heclo, Issue Networks and 
the Executive Establishment, in THE NEW AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM 87 (Anthony King ed., 1978); 
and CHRISTOPHER KOLIBA ET AL., GOVERNANCE NETWORKS IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND 
PUBLIC POLICY (2010). In legal writing, the governance network is associated with democratic 
experimentalism and new governance. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of 
Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998); Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of 
Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004). 
Networks also feature prominently in writing about global governance, e.g., ANNE-MARIE 
SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004); the European Union, e.g., EXPERIMENTALIST 
GOVERNANCE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: TOWARDS A NEW ARCHITECTURE (Charles F. Sabel & 
Jonathan Zeitlin eds., 2010); and much else, see David A. Bell, This is What Happens When Historians 
Overuse the Idea of the Network, NEW REPUBLIC (Oct. 25, 2013), https://newrepublic.com/
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organizations, commentators focus on more voluntary coordination among 
interdependent actors from all levels of government as well as the private and 
nonprofit sectors.241 Insofar as the network metaphor pervades contemporary 
writing, it is unsurprising that it appears in studies of regionalism.242 But the region 
also does particular work for the network idea. In its very lack of constitutional and 
institutional determinacy, the region provides a home for the network. With 
territorial form but no necessary connection to either state or federal government, 
the region offers areal concreteness with jurisdictional openness. 
The state–federal hybridity of past regional developments persists in this 
space, but it aspires to greater fluidity. While the Great Society’s revival of 
regionalism sought to integrate state and federal actors through joint 
commissions, for example, contemporary scholars and officials have grown 
more skeptical of autonomous regional entities.243 Still in search of “the 
elusive goal”244 of intergovernmental and interagency coordination, they 
instead tend to advocate—and to celebrate in existing projects—flexible, 
modular, interjurisdictional cooperation.245 
 
article/114709/world-connecting-reviewed-historians-overuse-network-metaphor [https://perma.cc/
368H-9JFS] (discussing the prevalence of “the controlling metaphor of the digital age: the ‘network’”). 
241 See, e.g., Laurence J. O’Toole, Jr., Treating Networks Seriously: Practical and Research-Based 
Agendas in Public Administration, 57 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 45, 45 (1997) (“Networks are structures of 
interdependence involving multiple organizations or parts thereof, where one unit is not merely the 
formal subordinate of the others in some larger hierarchical arrangement.”). 
242 See, e.g., Jonathan Cannon, Checking in on the Chesapeake: Some Questions of Design, 40 U. RICH. 
L. REV. 1131, 1131 (2006) (noting the “decentralized network character” of the Chesapeake Bay Program); 
Jody Freeman & Daniel A. Farber, Modular Environmental Regulation, 54 DUKE L.J. 795, 837 (2005) 
(suggesting a modular conception of the agency as “embedded in a network of relationships with other 
agencies”); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Collaborative Ecosystem Governance: Scale, Complexity, and Dynamism, 
21 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 189, 242 (2002) (arguing that the Chesapeake Bay Program includes “less formal 
networks of interpersonal and interagency relationships, and rich patterns of coordinated activity that 
cross and re-cross formal institutional lines”); cf. DOUGLAS REICHERT POWELL, CRITICAL 
REGIONALISM 4 (2007) (“[R]egion must refer not to a specific site but to a larger network of sites.”). 
243 See, e.g., Freeman & Farber, supra note 242, at 910 (“One could imagine . . . the formation of 
a collection of new, autonomous legal entities, correctly geared to the scale of a given environmental 
problem or geographic area and designed to replace existing agencies . . . . The political, legal, and 
economic costs of replacing existing bureaucratic structures with such entities seem overwhelming.”). 
244 ACIR, FEDERAL GRANTS, supra note 218, at 146. 
245 Freeman and Farber’s modular conception, explored in their study of the CalFed Bay-Delta 
Program, entails: (1) seeking to “overcome regulatory fracture through flexible coordination within and 
across government, and between public agencies and private actors”; (2) adapting form to function; (3) 
relying on agreement-based decisionmaking; (4) facilitating social learning through collaborative 
processes; (5) using an adaptive process that generates new information and integrates it into 
decisionmaking; and (6) promoting accountability through “informal controls and broad stakeholder 
participation.” Freeman & Farber, supra note 242, at 798-800; see also Dorf & Sabel, supra note 240. 
The integration of public and private actors is an important, and fraught, aspect of these 
networks that I do not address in this Article. See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, Administrative Law in the 
Twenty-First Century, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 451-52 (2003) (“The network strategy deliberately blurs 
the traditional distinction between public and private in favor of a cooperative fusion . . . . The 
network is not a legally accountable entity.”); cf. infra notes 304-306 and accompanying text. 
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The most ambitious regional network to date, the Chesapeake Bay 
restoration effort, illustrates the contrast to past regional approaches. If the 
TVA and the DRBC exemplify commitments of New Deal and Great Society 
regionalism, respectively, the Chesapeake is an early twenty-first century 
analog. Like its predecessors, it is a regional response to a body of water that 
runs through multiple states and to some attendant problems of 
fragmentation and overlapping jurisdiction. But while the TVA is a federal 
instrumentality,246 and the DRBC is a hybrid state–federal commission,247 
the Chesapeake program is a continually changing partnership among a large 
number of federal, state, and local government actors, as well as 
nongovernmental institutions. Both the composition and the approach of the 
Chesapeake project distinguish it from its regional progenitors. 
First, the Chesapeake program’s participants are far more numerous and 
diverse than those of bodies like the DRBC or ARC. This “highly elaborated, 
networked form”248 combines not only governors, the D.C. mayor, and the 
EPA Administrator in an echo of Great Society commissions, but also twenty 
additional “federal agency partners,” twenty-one state legislators, a citizens 
advisory committee, a local government advisory committee, a scientific 
advisory committee, state administrative officials, and numerous other NGO 
and academic institutions, which are “organized into committees, goal 
implementation teams, workgroups, and action teams.”249 
Second, all participants in the Chesapeake effort take for granted the 
overlap of state and federal jurisdiction (largely because of the cooperative 
federalism structure of the Clean Water Act), even though particular 
responsibilities may be lodged with one government or the other.250 But they 
 
246 See supra notes 156–162 and accompanying text. 
247 See supra Section III.A. 
248 Cannon, supra note 242, at 1132. 
249 See How We’re Organized, CHESAPEAKE BAY PROGRAM, http://www.chesapeakebay.net/
about/organized [https://perma.cc/NUZ9-UZFC]. In its earliest days, the program more closely 
resembled a Great Society regional body. The governors of Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Virginia, the 
mayor of D.C., the EPA Administrator, and the chair of the Chesapeake Bay Commission (comprising 
twenty-one state legislators) signed a bare-bones agreement in 1983 to protect the Bay. See Chesapeake 2000, 
CHESAPEAKE BAY PROGRAM (June 28, 2000), http://www.chesapeakebay.net/
channel_files/19193/chesapeake_2000.pdf [https://perma.cc/C7UP-Q4LZ]. This group, which became the 
Chesapeake Executive Council, largely replicated the structure of regional precedents like the DRBC—a 
hybrid regional body composed of state and federal actors. But it subsequently created various advisory 
committees to incorporate private expertise and mechanisms of public representation and accountability 
into its partnership, as well as adding new member states (Delaware, New York, and West Virginia). 
250 Trade groups, however, argued that the EPA was exceeding its powers. The Third Circuit 
rejected their arguments. See Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n v. EPA, 792 F.3d 281, 304 (3d Cir. 2015) (“[A]s 
here, once an agency is operating in the weeds of a statute that obviously requires federal oversight 
of some state functions, we will not require subordinate clear statements of congressional intent 
every time an interpretation arguably varies the usual balance of responsibilities between federal 
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do not equate jurisdiction with capacity. The program was therefore designed 
from the start as a flexible, “institutionally fungible, overtly experimental 
effort,” and, as it has developed, the roles and responsibilities of the actors 
involved have changed.251 States have responded to prompts from local, 
federal, and private actors, and vice versa; new working groups and 
committees have been generated; and each iteration of planning has gotten 
more specific as participants seek to implement lessons from past experience. 
The federal government, in particular, has grown more involved over time, 
but with the support of the states.252 In 2009, President Obama signed an 
executive order creating a Federal Leadership Committee to coordinate the 
efforts of various federal agencies participating in Bay restoration,253 and the 
Committee’s strategy report was later adopted by the six Bay states in a new 
agreement.254 The EPA also promulgated a Bay-wide Total Maximum Daily 
Load rule that built on existing state watershed implementation plans while 
also requiring a new round of such state plans to be developed in collaboration 
with EPA’s Region 3.255 Although the Chesapeake program has precipitated 
a more substantial role for the federal government over time, then, this role 
continues to depend heavily on state and local actors and to continually shift 
decisionmaking among these actors.256 
A related example of the contemporary regional network is the 
“megaregion,” though it remains more an analytic concept than a regulatory 
tool. In contrast to the Chesapeake Bay Program, megaregions—“networks 
 
and state sovereigns.”); id. at 310 (“Congress made a judgment in the Clean Water Act that the states 
and the EPA could, working together, best allocate the benefits and burdens of lowering pollution.”). 
251 Jamison E. Colburn, Coercing Collaboration: The Chesapeake Bay Experience, 40 WM. & 
MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 677, 698-99 (2016). 
252 See Oliver A. Houck, The Clean Water Act Returns (Again): Part I, TDMLS and the 
Chesapeake Bay, 41 ENVTL. L. REP. 10208, 10216 (2011) (“The first thing to strike the eye about the 
Obama Administration’s approach to the Chesapeake Bay is the extent to which the federal 
government assumes responsibility . . . . One cannot imagine such a shift in tone and tactics without 
at least tacit support from the states in the equation.”). 
253 The Federal Leadership Committee is chaired by the EPA Administrator and includes 
representatives from the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Homeland Security, the 
Interior, and Transportation. Exec. Order No. 13,508, 3 C.F.R. § 201 (2009). It is required to consult 
with the Bay states “to ensure that Federal actions to protect and restore the Chesapeake Bay are 
closely coordinated with actions by State and local agencies in the watershed.” Id. at § 204. 
254 Chesapeake Watershed Agreement, CHESAPEAKE BAY PROGRAM (June 16, 2014), 
http://www.chesapeakebay.net/documents/FINAL_Ches_Bay_Watershed_Agreement.withsignatur
es-HIres.pdf [https://perma.cc/T7B8-3659]. 
255 See, e.g., Letter from Shawn M. Garvin, Reg’l Adm’r, EPA Region 3, to L. Preston Bryant, Va. Sec’y 
of Nat. Resources & Chair of Principals’ Staff Comm. of the Chesapeake Exec. Council (Dec. 29, 2009), 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-07/documents/bay_letter_1209.pdf [https://perma.cc/KV99-
Q8PW] (discussing the EPA’s accountability framework for state watershed implementation plans). 
256 See, e.g., CHESAPEAKE BAY PROGRAM EXEC. COUNCIL, STATE OF THE CHESAPEAKE BAY 
PROGRAM 16-17 (2017), http://www.chesapeakebay.net/documents/25110/cbp_biennial_strategy_review_
system_state_of_the_program_report_6.5.17.pdf [https://perma.cc/8SX6-PGW2]. 
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of metropolitan centers and their surrounding areas, connected by existing 
environmental, economic, cultural, and infrastructure relationships”257—exist 
across the country rather than in one particular area (though the distinction 
should not be overstated given that each megaregion exists in only one location 
and the Chesapeake approach finds analogs elsewhere in the country, 
including the Great Lakes region).258 Most accounts suggest approximately 
ten megaregions in the United States today.259 As with the Chesapeake 
collaboration, in the megaregion, commentators and some government 
officials find the possibility of cooperation and mutual learning among federal, 
state, local, and nongovernmental actors concerning a variety of issues.260 
Though it is often presented as a novelty,261 the megaregion has deep roots 
in regionalist thought. In the 1920s, the Regional Plan of New York and its 
Environs argued that the growth of the city demanded a movement away from 
a single metropolis toward a larger, integrated area,262 and in 1967, following 
the publication of Jean Gottmann’s, Megalopolis, the Regional Plan Association 
sought to orient planning around the chain of cities running from Boston to 
Washington.263 A half-century on, the Regional Plan Association is again at 
the forefront of the push to recognize megaregions.264 In its contemporary 
guise, however, the megaregion includes two twenty-first century 
 
257 CATHERINE L. ROSS, CTR. FOR QUALITY GROWTH AND REG’L DEV., MEGAREGIONS: 
LITERATURE REVIEW OF THE IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT AND 
TRANSPORTATION PLANNING 1 (2008), https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/planning/megaregions/reports/
megaregions_report_2008/megaregions.pdf [https://perma.cc/6BSK-G2DG]. 
258 See GLRI Action Plan II, GREAT LAKES RESTORATION INITIATIVE, https://www.glri.us/
actionplan/index.html [https://perma.cc/BC35-YLA3]. 
259 See, e.g., Megaregions, AMERICA 2050, http://www.america2050.org/content/megaregions.html 
[https://perma.cc/2CMA-ZQDK] (“Most of the nation’s rapid population growth, and an even larger 
share of its economic expansion, is expected to occur in 11 megaregions: large networks of metropolitan 
regions, each megaregion covering thousands of square miles and located in every part of the country.”). 
260 See, e.g., id. (“The recognition of megaregions enables cooperation across jurisdictional 
borders to address specific challenges experienced at this scale.”). 
261 For instance, the megaregion is the sort of region Khanna celebrates in his “new map of 
America.” Khanna, supra note 3. 
262 COMM. ON REG’L PLAN OF N.Y. & ITS ENVIRONS, supra note 96. Some contemporary 
regionalists, including Lewis Mumford, objected to the urban focus of such regionalism. See, e.g., 
Elizabeth Baigent, Patrick Geddes, Lewis Mumford and Jean Gottmann: Divisions over “Megalopolis”, 28 
PROGRESS HUM. GEOGRAPHY 687 (2004); John L. Thomas, Holding the Middle Ground, in THE 
AMERICAN PLANNING TRADITION 33, 33-35 (Robert Fishman ed., 2000). 
263 REG’L PLAN ASS’N, THE REGION’S GROWTH 26-37 (1967); see id. at 36 (“[T]he urban region 
has lost its boundaries and should be considered an open-ended system, consisting of multi-centered, 
overlapping, and partially autonomous subunits.”); see also JEAN GOTTMANN, MEGALOPOLIS: THE 
URBANIZED NORTHEASTERN SEABORD OF THE UNITED STATES 560 (1961) (proposing a megalopolis 
running from Washington to Boston); Rupert Vance, Regions, in REGIONALISM AND THE SOUTH: 
SELECTED PAPERS OF RUPERT VANCE 312 (1982) (arguing in 1968 that “the high population density of 
the megalopolis” demands “regional-urban planning of a type as yet undeveloped”). 
264 See, e.g., REG’L PLAN ASS’N , supra note 263. 
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modifications: it is situated in the global economy, and it relies upon federal 
participation.265 In an echo of Great Society regionalism, commentators frame 
the federal government’s participation not as a threat but as a necessary spur 
to local capacity-building and coordination.266 Suggesting their own 
appreciation of this role, various federal actors, including particularly the 
Department of Transportation, have embraced the megaregion as a planning 
and development tool.267 Going forward, megaregions could assume a more 
prominent role in policymaking, or they could be dismissed as a passing fad. 
Much depends on the politics of today’s regionalism. 
B. Regionalism without Regions 
Both the Chesapeake Bay program’s current workings and the federal 
government’s interest in megaregions can be traced to Barack Obama’s 
presidency, our most regionalist presidency since FDR’s tenure. Although the 
Obama Administration’s regional focus followed from a variety of sources, a 
critical factor was partisan polarization, which has pushed state and federal actors 
alike into new alliances. The regional sorting of the Democratic and Republican 
Parties over the past half century has, ironically, allowed party to supersede 
region, so that today’s most powerful collaborations among state and federal 
actors need not involve contiguous areas. As partisanship overshadows place in 
contemporary governance, regionalism has begun to appear without regions. 
 
265 See, e.g., DOT, Megaregions, supra note 86 (“Megaregions are the infrastructure and economic 
footprint in the global economy. Megaregions provide a sustainable future through multi-scalar, cross-
boundary solutions. Megaregions allow us to think globally, coordinate regionally and act locally.”). 
266 This is of a piece with a broader recognition in the localism literature that the federal government 
may facilitate regional collaboration. See, e.g., Nestor M. Davidson, Fostering Regionalism: Comment on The 
Promise and Perils of “New Regionalist” Approaches to Sustainable Communities, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
675, 676 (2011) (arguing that the federal government may foster regionalism); Asha Pelman Ostrow, Emerging 
Counties? Prospects for Regional Governance in the Wake of Municipal Dissolution, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 187, 200 
(2013), https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/emerging-counties-prospects-for-regional-governance-in-the-
wake-of-municipal-dissolution [https://perma.cc/X648-PUDB] (“[T]he federal government is uniquely 
situated to encourage regional collaboration.”); cf. Lisa T. Alexander, The Promise and Perils of “New 
Regionalist” Approaches to Sustainable Communities, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 629, 633 (2011) (discussing a 
federal program’s “efforts to incentivize voluntary forms of participation and collaboration between 
multijurisdictional stakeholders” in facilitating regional planning). 
267 See DOT, Megaregions, supra note 86. In embracing the megaregion, these federal actors have also 
adopted the network approach, with “peer exchange” among representatives of federal agencies (including 
federal regional offices), state and local governments, planning commissions, and nongovernmental 
institutions driving the work thus far. See, e.g., TRANSP. PLANNING CAPACITY BUILDING PEER PROGRAM, 
U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., Megaregions Planning for MPOs and Partners: A TPCB Peer Exchange (2012), 
https://www.planning.dot.gov/documents/MAG_Megaregions_Planning_for_MPOs_TPCB_Peer_
Report_May%202012.pdf [https://perma.cc/PY34-DMVL]. 
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1. Contemporary Partnerships 
Although the term “regional” may not have not been “on the lips of the 
populace” during President Obama’s tenure, as Donald Davidson suggested 
of the New Deal years, it figured quite prominently “in the blue prints of the 
experts” and in executive orders.268 In addition to expressly regional 
undertakings like the Chesapeake Bay and Great Lakes restoration initiatives, 
a number of the Obama Administration’s most ambitious national projects 
involved regional components. The Clean Power Plan effectively 
incorporated the northeastern Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (“RGGI”) 
and encouraged additional regional cooperation among multiple states;269 the 
Affordable Care Act provided for states to create regional health exchanges 
(although states have not done so);270 and the Race to the Top program 
funded groups of states in their efforts to assess student learning.271 Less high-
profile initiatives, like the Sustainable Communities interagency partnership, 
likewise adopted regional approaches.272 
As during past regional moments,273 the regional impulses of the Obama 
Administration likely flowed from many sources, including new thinking 
about governance, the need to work within the interstices of existing 
complicated federalism arrangements, and a desire to quell opposition and 
claims of presidential overreach. But the significance of political polarization 
demands particular attention. Facing stiff Republican opposition in D.C., the 
federal executive branch sought allies where it could, and this generally meant 
Democratic states.274 The jurisdictional indeterminacy and interdependence 
captured by the network metaphor found partisan instantiation: by 
coordinating with ideologically aligned groups of states, the President and 
federal agencies could govern more successfully than they could through 
purely federal approaches.275 Even projects like the Chesapeake Bay 
 
268 DAVIDSON, supra note 103, at 58-59. 
269 See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility 
Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662, 64,838 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60) 
(explaining the “particular value of multi-state plans and multi-state coordination, which allow states 
to implement a plan in a coordinated fashion with other states”). 
270 42 U.S.C. § 18031(f)(1) (2012). 
271 See DEP’T OF EDUC., Overview Information; Race to the Top Fund Assessment Program; 
Notice Inviting Applications for New Awards for Fiscal Year (FY) 2010, 75 Fed. Reg. 18,171, 18,171 
(Apr. 9, 2010) (inviting consortia of states to develop assessments to track student progress). 
272 See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
273 See, e.g., supra notes 139-143 and accompanying text (noting various sources of New Deal 
regionalism). 
274 See generally Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Executive Federalism Comes to America, 102 VA. L. REV. 
953 (2016). 
275 Id.; see also Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Gillian Metzger, The President and the States: Patterns of 
Contestation and Collaboration Under Obama, 46 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 308, 309 (2016) (“National 
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restoration progressed because partisanship facilitated coordination “by the 
dominance of an idea”276 shared among the federal administration and mid-
Atlantic, Democratic states.277 Meanwhile, administrative concessions to 
partisan-opposed states sought to minimize their resistance.278 
Because many of these concessions were unsuccessful, the Obama years 
gave rise not only to new partnerships between the federal government and 
groups of blue states, but also to intense joint state efforts to resist federal 
policy. Recalling the premise of 1920s regionalists that states could forestall 
federal governance only by aggregating their powers, groups of red states 
pooled their resources. Unlike their early twentieth century counterparts, 
these states were not seeking to obviate the need for federal governance 
through their own regulatory collaborations; their objective was demolition 
of proposed or extant federal regulation. But to achieve this end, the states 
banded together, often enlisting the support of ideologically aligned federal 
actors as well.279 For example, nine states joined a proposed interstate Health 
Care Compact that would effectively repeal the Affordable Care Act in their 
jurisdictions by “restor[ing] authority and responsibility for health care 
regulation to the member states.”280 With greater success, red state attorneys 
general from across the country brought legal challenges to federal policies 
concerning health care, immigration, environmental protection, and more.281 
 
policy is increasingly determined by presidentially instigated executive branch action, but it is 
executive action taken in conjunction with the states.”). 
276 LUTHER GULICK, Notes on the Theory of Organization, in PAPERS ON THE SCIENCE OF 
ADMINISTRATION 1, 6 (Luther Gulick & L. Urwick eds., 1937). 
277 Like other Obama-era initiatives, the partnership is quite vulnerable under the Trump 
Administration, although the regional structure of the EPA may provide a buffer. 
278 See Bulman-Pozen, supra note 274. 
279 See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions, HEALTH CARE COMPACT, https://web.archive.org/
web/20151129232727/http://www.healthcarecompact.org:80/faq/ [https://perma.cc/HV9V-XFK4] 
(“Why is one compact better? We believe that having the states united in confronting the federal 
government is better politically.”). 
280 States Consider Health Compacts to Challenge Federal PPACA, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATORS, (Dec. 
1, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/states-pursue-health-compacts.aspx [https://perma.cc/6KC9-
7FFC]. The compact did not receive federal approval, although it sparked an argument about whether 
interstate compacts require presidential consent or only congressional consent. See Bulman-Pozen, supra note 
274, at 1026-27. Texas also proposed an Interstate Compact for Border Security. See Terrence Stutz, Texas 
Senate Votes for Interstate Compact to Enforce Federal Immigration Laws, DALL. MORNING NEWS (May 7, 2015), 
http://www.dallasnews.com/news/state/headlines/20150506-senate-votes-to-enforce-federal-immigration-
laws-with-interstate-compact1.ece [https://perma.cc/5Y4C-NBSP] (reporting that the Texas legislature 
“approved a bill that would be the first step in establishing the Border Security Interstate Compact”). 
281 See, e.g., Brief for State Respondents, United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (No. 15-674) 
(challenging Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA)); Opening 
Brief of Petitioners on Core Legal Issues at 29-78, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 19, 2016) 
(challenging the Clean Power Plan); PAUL NOLETTE, FEDERALISM ON TRIAL: STATE ATTORNEYS 
GENERAL AND NATIONAL POLICYMAKING IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 168-203 (2015). 
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The partisan valence of multistate opposition to the federal executive has, 
unsurprisingly, flipped with the inauguration of President Trump. Now blue 
states are banding together to sue the federal executive over health care, 
immigration, environmental protection, and more.282 Their collaborations 
have also begun to extend to multistate governance. When Trump declared 
that the United States would withdraw from the Paris Climate Agreement, 
the Democratic governors of California, New York, and Washington 
immediately announced a partnership to support the global agreement.283 
Additional blue states have since joined the U.S. Climate Alliance, which 
seeks to uphold U.S. commitments under the Paris Agreement and to meet 
the targets of Obama’s Clean Power Plan,284 and they are working with 
hundreds of cities, businesses, and nonprofit organizations.285 In addition, 
blue city mayors have been trying to pool resources with respect to 
immigration policy,286 and pundits have even floated a progressive version of 
the Health Care Compact in the event Obamacare is repealed.287 In these and 
 
282 See, e.g., Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Support of a Temporary Restraining Order, California v. 
Trump, No. 4:17-cv-05895-KAW (N.D. Cal. Oct 18, 2017) (challenging the Trump Administration’s 
decision to discontinue cost-sharing reduction payments pursuant to the Affordable Care Act); Hawaii 
v. Trump, 2017 WL 4639560 (Oct. 17, 2017) (challenging the third iteration of President Trump’s travel 
ban); Petition for Review, New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy (2nd Cir. Mar. 31, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/JS5N-V5UV (challenging the Department of Energy’s decision to delay the effective 
date of an energy conservation rule); Letter from Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney Gen. of N.Y., to 
Kevin S. Minoli, Acting Gen. Counsel, U.S. Envt’l Prot. Agency, Re: Letter from Administrator Pruitt 
Advising Governors on Legal Effect of Stay of Clean Power Plan (Aug. 30, 2017) (objecting to the EPA 
Administrator’s guidance regarding the Clean Power Plan). 
283 See Michael Greshko, Map Shows Growing U.S. ‘Climate Rebellion’ Against Trump, NAT’L 
GEOGRAPHIC (June 8, 2017), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/2017/06/states-cities-usa-climate-policy-
environment [https://perma.cc/4R4L-BBTF] (“The same day as Trump’s announcement, the states of New 
York, California, and Washington announced the formation of the United States Climate Alliance.”). 
284 See UNITED STATES CLIMATE ALLIANCE, https://www.usclimatealliance.org (listing 
member states). All the states involved but two—Massachusetts and Vermont—have Democratic 
governors, although even those two are better understood as blue states (nearly the bluest of them all) 
given the composition of the state legislatures, their exclusively Democratic congressional delegations, and 
the state votes in successive presidential elections. Nonetheless, the force of regionalism is apparent here 
as well—the only Republican governors to sign on are New Englanders. See infra text accompanying 
notes 292-309 (discussing the evolving relationship between regionalism and partisanship). 
285 See “We Are Still In” Declaration, WE ARE STILL IN, https://www.wearestillin.com/we-are-
still-declaration [https://perma.cc/2F3S-MQDC] (listing governments, educational institutions, 
and businesses agreeing to continue to support climate action to meet the Paris Agreement); Cities 
Adopt the Paris Climate Agreement Goals, CLIMATE MAYORS, http://climatemayors.org 
[https://perma.cc/8A4R-4B3P] (noting nearly 400 mayors committing to uphold the Paris goals). 
286 J. David Goodman, De Blasio and Big City Mayors Try Pooling Their Power Against Trump, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 29, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/29/nyregion/bill-de-blasio-donald-
trump-mayors.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2017). 
287 See, e.g., Robert Jackel & Alex Green, How Treaties Between States Could Keep Obamacare 
Alive, ATLANTIC (Feb. 4, 2017) https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/02/interstate-
compacts-save-obamacare/515604/ [https://perma.cc/NVL7-4N5U] (suggesting that “progressive 
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other nascent multistate ventures, copartisanship links states (and other 
actors) without regard to geographical proximity. 
This is today’s most significant regional development: a regionalism 
without regions. To be sure, more geographically defined regional projects 
persist (although even some of these, like RGGI), have been shaped by 
partisanship,288 and these partisan projects have a distinct territorial logic. 
But anyone looking for the force of today’s regionalism must contend with 
the significance of party over place. 
2. From Sectionalism to Partisanship 
If party has come to overshadow place, an objection to the regionalism 
frame presents itself immediately: geography defines regionalism.289 Take 
away areal contiguity, and you may have interstate cooperation, cross-
jurisdictional networks, or much else, but not regionalism. Although the 
objection has force, it is productive to consider this latest development as a 
species of regionalism rather than a distinct phenomenon. 
As an initial matter, the departure from geography is only partial: what I 
am calling “regionalism without regions” still depends on area insofar as it 
entails collaboration among partisan-aligned jurisdictions. These 
jurisdictions (usually states) need not be contiguous, but they are defined 
physical spaces rather than nonterritorial aggregations of individuals or 
groups based on perceived affinities of class, race, religion, occupation, or the 
like. Regionalism without regions continues to rely upon geography and to 
hew to the logic of territorial representation, even if it scrambles the 
territory.290 Especially because the unified-area region has always been a 
malleable form,291 the departure may be seen as a matter of degree, not kind. 
 
states” could use interstate compacts to “set up their own multistate health-care programs to fill the 
gaps created by the federal government”). 
288 Republican Governor Chris Christie withdrew New Jersey from RGGI. See supra note 35. 
Every Democratic candidate in the 2017 New Jersey gubernatorial primary favored rejoining RGGI. 
Maddie Hanna & Andrew Seidman, NJ Candidates for Governor 2017: Issue-by-Issue Comparison, 
PHILLY.COM (June 1, 2017), http://www.philly.com/philly/news/politics/nj/Candidates-for-New-
Jersey-Governor.html [https://perma.cc/FVN3-J8GD]. 
289 See notes 16–17 and accompanying text (discussing definitions). 
290 Cf. ANDREW REHFELD, THE CONCEPT OF CONSTITUENCY: POLITICAL 
REPRESENTATION, DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY, AND INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 145-234 (2005) 
(considering alternatives to territorial constituency). 
291 See, e.g., Frankfurter, supra note 15, at xvi (“No region, whether natural or cultural, is 
stable.”); Limerick, supra note 9, at 96 (“While geography plays a role in their definition, regions 
are much more the creations of human thought and behavior than they are the products of nature.”); 
D.W. Meinig, The Continuous Shaping of America: A Prospectus for Geographers and Historians, 83 AM. 
HIST. REV. 1186, 1202 (1978) (“[R]egions [are] complex, ambiguous, and changing phenomena. 
Regions are abstractions, they exist in our minds.”). 
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On a more functional note, moreover, regionalism without regions performs 
some of the critical work that regional projects have consistently aspired to over 
the past century. Regionalism has been, first, a means of preserving state 
vitality in the face of perceived need for larger-scale governance. Today, as in 
the past, the state is most powerful when it stands with others, but there is no 
need for it to stand next to these others; proximity is not required for mutual 
identification or for coordination. Regionalism has also diversified exercises of 
federal power as it has been incorporated into federal programs. In recent years, 
party-inflected difference has become a more plausible basis than geography 
for instantiating pluralism in many national programs. 
But these are largely defensive observations. The principal rationale for 
applying a regionalism lens to these noncontiguous alliances among state and 
federal actors is that they are the contemporary manifestation of 
sectionalism.292 Administrative regionalism and political sectionalism have 
always been closely related—from the placing of Federal Reserve Banks in the 
credit-poor South, to the New Deal’s appeasement of the white South, to 
President Johnson’s concern with Appalachian states, to the Obama 
Administration’s attempted accommodation of coal states in the Clean Power 
Plan, and much else.293 The linguistic footwork that Odum and his fellow New 
Deal regionalists performed to submerge antagonistic sectionalism within 
harmonious regionalism294 and various regional accommodations by federal 
agencies have suggested that an administrative pluralism might mute the 
divisiveness of sectionalism. But allowing regional difference within federal 
programs has always been at least a partial concession to sectionalism’s force. 
In today’s state–federal and state-state partisan collaborations, old 
sectional patterns are readily apparent: the red coalition is centered in the 
South, while the blue coalition is anchored by New England and the Pacific 
West.295 This is unsurprising because, as scholars including Richard Bensel 
and Nicole Mellow have documented, there are deep “regional sources of 
 
292 I agree thus far with Michael Greve’s characterization: “An increasing number of states 
have become reliably ‘red’ or ‘blue,’ and those blocs divide sharply over highly salient questions of 
public policy . . . . Partisan, ideological polarization in this geographic, state-level dimension is a 
form of political sectionalism.” Michael Greve, Our Polarized, Presidential Federalism, in 
PARCHMENT BARRIERS: POLITICAL POLARIZATION AND THE LIMITS OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
ORDER (Zachary C. Courser et al. eds., forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 3). 
293 See, e.g., Sarah Binder & Mark Spindel, Monetary Politics: Origins of the Federal Reserve, STUD. AM. 
POL. DEV. 1, 10-12 (2013) (“[C]ities in the South had a greater chance of being selected to host a reserve bank 
than cities in the Northeast.”); supra notes 125–138, 220 and accompanying text. See generally FESLER, supra 
note 11, at 123 (“The coin bearing ‘regionalism’ on its face carries ‘sectionalism’ on its reverse side.”). 
294 See supra Section II.C. 
295 See, e.g., Greve, supra note 292, at 20 (arguing that under Obama, “[t]he dissident states, by 
and large, are the states of the old confederacy (along with newcomers like Utah)”). 
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modern American partisanship.”296 Indeed, the power of these sources to 
continually shape party politics was on prominent display in the Rust Belt 
during the 2016 presidential election.297 
Even as party and section remain closely connected, however, partisanship has 
assumed greater force in predicting jurisdictional alignments. In the U.S. Climate 
Alliance, for example, the blue Northeast (Connecticut, Delaware, Massachusetts, 
New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont) forms a traditional sectional bloc, but it is 
joined not only by the Pacific Coast states (California, Oregon, and Washington), 
but also by Virginia (a former Confederate state blued by its D.C. suburbs), 
Minnesota (today’s Midwestern Democratic stronghold), Colorado (a more 
tenuous, Southwestern blue outpost), and Hawaii (a neighborless blue 
archipelago), as well as Puerto Rico. The alliance has also found support from the 
Democratic Governors of still-more sectionally incongruous states including 
Montana and North Carolina. If clear traces of traditional sectionalism remain, 
partisanship is the more pressing consideration.298 
There is an irony at the heart of the shift from sectionalism to partisanship as 
a dominant political force: the regional sorting of the Democratic and Republican 
Parties over the past half century has enabled party to supersede region. For 
much of the twentieth century, the Democratic Party’s strength in the South 
meant that both parties were loose, ideologically diverse confederations that 
encompassed diverse regional interests. Although this became most apparent 
following FDR’s election, as early as the 1920s, Munro and Turner could note the 
role of the party as an “elastic band” holding the sections of the country 
 
296 MELLOW, supra note 12. Bensel’s account focuses on political economy, while Mellow insists 
on the importance of both material and cultural sources, but both they and other scholars suggest that 
“party competition and ideological belief-systems are the epiphenomena of inevitable sectional 
competition” or regional identification. BENSEL, supra note 125, at 17; see MELLOW, supra note 12, at 
20 (“Political economists fail to explain the contemporary cultural divisions that are paramount in 
political debate . . . . Regions remain powerful in American politics precisely because they fuse 
economic and cultural experiences.”); see also EARL BLACK & MERLE BLACK, DIVIDED AMERICA 
145-207 (2007) (exploring the “regional structure” of presidential and congressional elections). 
297 Scholars attentive to sectionalism anticipated key developments in the 2016 presidential contest. 
See Richard Bensel, Sectionalism and Congressional Development, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE 
AMERICAN CONGRESS 761, 783 (George C. Edwards III et al. eds., 2011) (suggesting that protectionist 
demands create stresses within each party’s coalition and that Republicans might move toward trade 
protection “using nationalist arguments as their justification”); cf. MELLOW, supra note 12, at 174 
(suggesting that pressures of globalization and deindustrialization might yield regional realignments). 
298 As the U.S. Climate Alliance underscores, collaborations among cities or involving foreign 
jurisdictions might be considered part of regionalism without regions, even though this Article 
focuses on states and the federal government. Incorporating cities into the account seems 
particularly warranted given the urban/rural mapping of partisanship within blue and red states 
alike. See supra notes 285-286 and accompanying text. See generally Resnik et al., supra note 38 
(exploring translocal organizations of government actors); Larazo Gamio, Urban and Rural America 
Are Becoming Increasingly Polarized, WASH. POST (Nov. 17, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
graphics/politics/2016-election/urban-rural-vote-swing/ [https://perma.cc/CV22-DJR6] (tracking 
voting patterns in urban and rural counties). 
2018] Our Regionalism 439 
together.299 Munro further bemoaned the lack of responsible party government 
that resulted, impliedly recognizing that there was roughly as much diversity 
within each party as there was between the two parties.300 
As conservative Southern Democrats moved to the Republican Party and 
liberal Northern Republicans moved to the Democratic Party in the latter half 
of the twentieth century, however, regional partisan difference declined, and 
partisanship and ideology became more closely aligned.301 With the demise of 
the Southern Democrat and the Rockefeller Republican also came the end of 
the party as an elastic band for sectional difference. The lingering sectional 
character of each party is unmistakable, if fully reversed from a century prior: 
in particular, the South is Republican territory, while the Northeast is strongly 
Democratic.302 But the very fact that parties are now cohesive, ideologically-
driven entities means they have a power that transcends geography.303 In the 
policy decisions and chosen alliances of blue Minnesota and Colorado and their 
red neighbors Wisconsin and Utah, partisanship trumps place. 
The upshot of the regional sorting of parties, then, is a regionalism 
(largely) without regions. Coalitions of blue or red states spread across the 
country, and because partisanship is the proximate cause of their 
collaboration, they evince only a partial sectional logic. To add a further irony, 
the powerful partisanship driving these coalitions is a “partisanship without 
parties.”304 The strong party organizations of twentieth-century politics have 
been “hollowed-out.”305 Instead, contemporary parties constitute “networks” 
of elected representatives, interest groups, issue activists, PACs and Super 
PACS, consultants, and more.306 Although radically decentralized in some 
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respects, these parties remain cohesive and forceful. Their decentralized 
structure also facilitates connections among jurisdictions that are not 
geographically close to one another. Regionalism without regions can thus 
fairly be said to be sponsored by a partisanship without parties. 
Although both party and place continue to shape our politics, the relatively 
greater force of partisanship affects the map in two readily observable ways. First, 
there are only two main parties, while any plausible map of American regions 
contains numerous divisions. There remain regional variations in the Democratic 
and Republican Parties, but the overall sorting of every state into the D or R 
column presents a different, and less diverse, map than does a multi-region 
variant. Second, notwithstanding sectional influences, partisan-affiliated 
states are often far apart. Most notably, the bluest areas of the country fall on 
opposite coasts. This has consequences, among other things, for the primary 
specter associated with sectionalism: secession. Insofar as California cannot 
take along the Northeast in its bid to leave the Union, party may indeed 
continue to serve as a sort of geographical “elastic band.” 
CONCLUSION 
As the recurring efforts to draw new maps of the United States underscore, 
regions seem more natural than states—organic districts that precede the 
cartographer’s ruler and persist in spite of it. Yet because regions have no 
established legal form, efforts at regional governance necessarily involve 
deliberate acts of political construction. If regions arise from a search to overcome 
artificial jurisdictional lines, they are themselves manufactured. Because they 
have been constructed differently over time, moreover, regions illuminate 
shifting anxieties about state and federal government in particular periods. But 
the region is not only an analytic tool. Regional projects have critically shaped 
both state and federal government and the relationship between them. 
This Article has focused on regionalism as both a source of resistance to 
the federal government and an enabler of its growth across the twentieth and 
early twenty-first centuries. Advocates of state power have turned to the 
region to address complex problems and resist federal intervention, but 
architects of the administrative state have likewise turned to the region to 
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expand federal bureaucracy. Insofar as regionalism has eased the federal 
government’s entry into new areas of domestic policymaking, the centrifugal, 
state-empowering impulses of many regional proponents have also been 
folded into federal programs, and new projects of multi-state and joint state–
federal regionalism have arisen. If the regional thesis is state power and the 
antithesis is national power, the rather durable, albeit shape-shifting, 
synthesis we have arrived at is mutual state and federal influence through 
regional organization and collaboration. 
Today, that accommodation is generating a regionalism without regions. 
This partisan-inflected variant reminds us of administrative regionalism’s roots 
in political sectionalism and underscores another perpetual regional paradox, 
that regions have been both feared as the principal threat to national union and 
celebrated as a needed font of solidarity in a divided polity.307 Given the 
intensity of contemporary partisan polarization and the territorial distribution 
of partisans, regionalism without regions may heighten both this threat and this 
promise. It has the potential to exacerbate already-fever-pitch-level partisan 
rancor and divisiveness,308 but it may also foster governance and solidarity amid 
such division. If most states are too small to engage in ambitious governance 
projects on their own, for instance, party-linked jurisdictions might work 
together to achieve shared objectives through state-based collective action.309 
In so doing, they might also generate both practical models and constituencies 
for future federal programs and the sense of shared undertaking that helps 
bind a polity together. To be sure, this would be a partial solidarity, but it 
might contribute to, rather than threaten, a larger project of national 
solidarity given underlying territorial diversity.310 Moreover, partisan 
accommodations for groups of states within federal policy could offer a path 
to policymaking in polarized conditions, giving concrete form to difference 
without giving up on the project of national governance.311 These are 
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aspirations, not assumptions. But they are aspirations that begin from the 
premise of polarized partisanship instead of denying its force. 
In celebrating the study of regionalism, Justice Frankfurter called for 
consideration of “homogeneous diversities within the nation that do not 
correspond to the division between the Union and the . . . states.”312 Suggesting 
that the Constitution provided for evolving regional arrangements even though 
it expressly mentioned only state and federal organs, he insisted that “[t]he vast 
and variegated resources of a nation lying between the Atlantic and the Pacific 
. . . were not denied opportunities for resourcefulness in making a unity out of 
diversities apart from the Union of the states.”313 Regionalism without regions 
is the most significant current attempt to make “a unity out of diversities” in 
the space between state and nation. A regional frame helps us to grapple with 
this nascent and uncertain development, even as it underscores that regionalism 
is sure to assume yet another shape before long. 
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